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“[T]hey were convinced that private property by itself would 
transform the Indians.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American Indian land tenure has long been the target of federal 
policies seeking to change, through property law reforms, indigenous 
peoples’ relationships to each other, to the land and natural environment, 
and to surrounding non-Indian influences.  Many of these top-down land 
reforms have had negative effects for Indian landowners and Indian 
communities.  Two of the most direct and well-documented 
consequences are a pervasive pattern of fractionation or co-ownership 
within individually owned Indian lands and a persistent, restrictive 
federal trust status through which the federal government, as trustee, 
exercises significant land management oversight and control on Indian 
lands. 
This article focuses on another change in individual Indians’ 
property rights that has not previously been identified or studied in-
depth: the gradual elimination of any presumptive right of individual 
Indian owners to use and possess land they jointly own with one or more 
co-owners.  This modern Indian property rule means that Indian co-
owners of land enjoy no default right to use and possess their own 
property.  This no-use and no-possession rule for Indian co-owners is 
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contrary to both current federal Indian policy and the default rule for co-
ownership in nearly every non-Indian context.  A defining characteristic 
of common law co-ownership forms is the rule that all co-owners of land 
have an equal and undivided right to possess the entire estate, 
concurrently and presumptively, without the prior consent of their co-
owners and typically without any obligation to pay rent for that 
possession. 2   The opposite rule has developed in Indian property 
gradually and through a series of mostly agency-level decisions that have 
not been the subject of any significant debate or discussion.3  Individual 
Indian owners have quietly lost their rights to use and possess jointly 
owned land despite repeated rounds of modern federal Indian statutes 
seeking to foster the opposite effect—Indian self-determination and 
Indian use of Indian land.4 
Starting in 1887 with the General Allotment Act, Congress began to 
formalize a transition to Western forms of private property ownership 
within tribes’ reserved territories.5  By forcing the uniform “allotment” of 
reservation land to individual Indians, Congress sought to break up tribes 
as a controlling social and political influence and to assimilate individual 
Indians into idealized versions of the agrarian, Jeffersonian farmer, all 
based on a belief in the transformative power of private property. 6  
Individual Indian allottees initially took title to their allotments not in a 
simple fee title but rather in a special trust status intended to prevent 
imprudent alienation of the land and to impose some preliminary federal 
oversight on individual land management decisions while the Indian 
allottees’ intended transition to “civilized” farmer took effect. 
Over time, allotment and the trust restrictions it imposed failed to 
create prosperous economies of individual farm proprietorships within 
tribal communities.  Instead, patterns of pervasive co-ownership emerged 
on Indian allotments, with title to individually owned Indian land 
                                                          
 2.  See infra Part II. 
 3.  See infra Parts IV–V. 
 4.  See, e.g., infra Part IV.A, B.4, C.  This article treats use and possession rights somewhat 
interchangeably for this purpose, which is consistent with the Department of Interior’s general 
practice to refer to these rights collectively as “owner’s use” rights.  However, of course, in some 
aspects of traditional property law use and possession rights are distinct; see also infra text 
accompanying note 259; cf. A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 
113, 116 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
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U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 339, 341–342, 348–349, 354, 381 (2012)). 
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becoming progressively fractionated as initial allotments passed, 
typically to multiple heirs, through a formulaic intestacy process and the 
restraints on alienation imposed by the federal trust status became 
permanent.  Today, the majority of these remaining individual Indian 
allotments are co-owned by numerous (sometimes several hundred or 
more) co-owners, and most of these reservation lands are either leased to 
non-Indians through a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) leasing program or 
are not used at all.  This restrictive trust status also creates an enormous 
and expensive record keeping and administrative burden for the federal 
government.7 
To date, any serious discussions or scholarship regarding Indian land 
tenure (and Indian poverty more generally) have focused largely on two 
interrelated issues.  The first is the practical problems of fractionation 
(e.g., the high transaction costs associated with having so many different 
co-owners).  The second is the cumbersome federal trust system that 
restricts alienation of these fractional interests and otherwise imposes a 
cumbersome bureaucratic process on almost any land transaction. 8  
Therefore, proposed solutions have focused on how to consolidate 
fractional interests to reduce the total number of co-owners per tract,9 
                                                          
 7.  See, e.g., infra Parts III, IV.B.4, V.A. 
 8.  Most trust property today still cannot be transferred, alienated, or leased without the 
approval of the Secretary of Interior.  25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 348, 464, 2216, 2218 (2012); see also 25 
C.F.R. § 152.17 (2014).  Some new exceptions for tribal leases of tribal lands now exist, but these do 
not apply to individually owned trust allotments.  See, e.g., Helping Expedite and Advance 
Responsible Tribal Home Ownership (HEARTH) Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 415). 
  By way of brief background, most Indian reservations today are characterized by a 
checkerboard of different tenure types within reservation boundaries.  Land is now owned in 
essentially one of three categories.  In the first category, the federal government holds significant 
portions of land in trust for the tribe itself (“tribal trust lands”).  Land is also held, often by non-
Indian owners who are not members of the governing tribe, in a traditional fee title.  FELIX S. 
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.03, at 998–99 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 COHEN HANDBOOK].  A third category—and the subject of this article—is land 
held in trust by the federal government on behalf of individual Indian owners (“individual trust 
lands” or “allotments”).  Id. at 1071. 
 9.  See, e.g., Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 764–70, 782–87 (discussing and critiquing prior 
federal legislative consolidation efforts and arguing for flexible, equitable distribution of co-
ownership interests at probate to promote case-by-case consolidation); Jered T. Davidson, Comment, 
This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land? Why the Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian 
Land Fractionation, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575 (2011) (arguing for dormant interest termination 
solution); Brian Sawers, Tribal Land Corporations: Using Incorporation to Combat Fractionation, 
88 NEB. L. REV. 385 (2009) (arguing incorporation model as solutions for co-owner cooperation); 
Anthony J. Franken, Student Article, Dealing with the Whip End of Someone Else’s Crazy: 
Individual-Based Approaches to Indian Land Fractionation, 57 S.D. L. REV. 345 (2012) (arguing for 
estate planning solutions). 
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and streamline or eliminate the federal trust bureaucracy itself.10  Little 
or no attention has been paid, however, to the fundamental rights that 
these individual Indian co-owners actually possess during life or how, 
given this fractionation, the individual entitlements and co-ownership 
institutions might be better designed to promote Indian use of Indian 
resources within the limits of the existing system.11 
Indeed, so little attention has been paid to individual Indian 
landowners’ actual legal rights to possession of their property (or lack 
thereof) that several legal authorities have relied on now-incorrect 
assumptions about Indian property rights or otherwise failed to recognize 
the modern changes taking place.  These legal authorities include such 
bastions as the Supreme Court and the leading contemporary tribal 
membership organization and Indian law lobbying organization.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has twice considered whether Indians’ right 
to devise even the smallest fractional interests in these individual trust 
lands can be eliminated or significantly restricted, or whether doing so 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of private property requiring just 
compensation to the individual property owner.12  While assessing the 
taking of this one property right—the right to devise—the Court noted 
that these landowners otherwise “retained full beneficial use of the 
property during their lifetimes”13—but this is no longer true.  Likewise, 
                                                          
 10.  Richard A. Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The Double-Edged 
Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising out of Early Supreme Court 
Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35 (1995) (arguing for tribal control of 
Indian property systems); Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming 
Tribal Property Law, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 496–97 (2001) (arguing for a conversion 
from a federal trust to a tribal trust system); Stacy L. Leeds, Moving Toward Exclusive Tribal 
Autonomy over Lands and Natural Resources, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 439, 455–61 (2006) (same); 
see also PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INDIAN ECONOMIES (Terry L. Anderson ed., 1992). 
 11.  Many property law scholars and social scientists have recognized, in other contexts, the 
importance of carefully designing default rules for jointly owned property to promote co-owner 
cooperation and achieve the most efficient use of resources, while also satisfying personal, familial, 
and community goals.  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 
YALE L.J. 549 (2001) (arguing co-ownership default rules should encourage individual autonomy 
and self-governance while also providing an exit mechanism that maximizes cooperation); Thomas 
W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black Landownership, Political 
Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
505, 517–21 (2001) (discussing the role of partition rights in the problem of black farmer land loss); 
Sarah E. Waldeck, Rethinking the Intersection of Inheritance and the Law of Tenancy in Common, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 737 (2011) (discussing the relevance of property rules for families seeking 
to maintain certain “identity property,” such as a family cottage). 
 12.  Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717–18 
(1987).  The Court’s takings analysis in these cases has been the subject of significant scholarly 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of 
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999). 
 13.  Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715. 
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some property scholars have pointed to these fractionated individual 
Indian titles as an example of the anticommons problem by which too 
much ownership can result in under-utilization of a resource.14  These 
discussions, however, have largely not reflected that most Indian 
landowners are now legally precluded from directly utilizing the resource 
on their own.  In some sense, the current issue on Indian lands is not a 
simple anticommons in which there is too much ownership, but rather a 
unique absence of the fundamental right of ownership—the right to 
possession—in any of the co-owners.  Finally, even the National 
Congress of American Indians, the largest pan-Indian indigenous rights 
lobbying organization, expressed dismay and shock when the 
Department of Interior’s most recent surface leasing regulations required 
a formal lease approved by the BIA (with an obligation to pay rent) even 
for co-owners taking possession of their own land—although this had 
arguably already been the Department’s interpretation of individual 
Indians’ property rights for roughly a decade.15 
Analyzing the lack of individual rights to use and possess Indian land 
is particularly salient now.  Congress and the Department of Interior are 
currently in the early stages of a ten-year effort to spend $1.9 billion in 
settlement funds from the Cobell litigation to purchase some of these 
small fractional interests from willing sellers and return them to the 
governing tribe.16  If executed effectively, this fractional interest buy-
                                                          
 14.  MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS 
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES, 125–29 (2008); see also Dagan & Heller, supra 
note 11, at 564 n.56; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 685–87 (1998). 
 15.  Comment of Jefferson Keel, President, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, to Del Laverdure, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Indian Affairs (Jan. 30, 2011) at 2–3, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BIA-2011-0001-0072 [hereinafter NCAI 
Comments].  Mr. Keel argued each landowner in a tenancy in common “has full rights to use the 
property in any manner” and is “‘not liable for rent to the other co-tenant in the ordinary course of 
their relationship.’”  Id. (quoting 1 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES 2:1.5 (Patrick A. Randolph ed., 2011)).  
He also noted there is “no authority in federal law for BIA to diminish the property rights of each 
Indian co-owner and to require co-owners to pay rent for the use of their own property.”  Id.; see 
also NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, RES. PDX-11-015, HOMESITE LEASING, OWNER CONSENT AND 
THE INDIAN LAND CONSOLIDATION ACT (2011), http://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_xrJM 
zVCyQhldPTtOSdUpYGKVSEXWbNqszNOGlORZReZWIxDQyya_PDX-11-015_final.pdf 
[hereinafter NCAI Resolution]. 
 16.  In 1996, Eloise Cobell famously filed a class action against the Secretary of Interior 
claiming the agency had violated its federal trust responsibility to Native American citizens by 
failing to account for billions of dollars in Indian trust assets, including income from individual 
trust lands.  The federal courts generally agreed that the government had breached its trust 
responsibility, and the parties settled for $3.4 billion.  From these settlement funds, $1.9 billion is 
allocated to purchasing small fractional interests from willing Indian sellers in order to reduce 
fractionation, which is seen as exacerbating the Department of Interior’s accounting challenges.  See 
Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 913–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808, 809 
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back program could go a long way toward reducing the total number of 
co-owners in an average fractionated individual trust property to a more 
manageable number.  Even a buy-back fund this large, though, is 
insufficient to eliminate fractionation and co-ownership completely.17  
Nonetheless, as the number of co-owners per tract goes down, tribes 
must be supported in reevaluating local property rules.  This is necessary 
not just to maintain any reduction in Indian land fractionation.  It is also 
needed, more broadly, to create a more rational system of incentives and 
entitlements for individual co-owners to maximize all of the potential 
values of owning this resource, including the potential benefits of 
making some local, informal arrangements for the use and possession of 
land that may have important personal, social, and economic 
significances. 
This article asserts that the current federal rules for Indian co-
ownership of trust land are poorly designed and have erred too far on the 
side of the marginal interests of absentee landowners at the expense of 
the property rights of active local landowners whose direct use of their 
own jointly owned lands could have broader long-term benefits.  This 
article proceeds in five parts.  Part II begins with an analysis of the rules, 
and what we have learned, from traditional co-ownership frameworks in 
the non-Indian context.  Part III discusses the specific context of this 
Indian law property problem.  Part IV then provides an analysis of how 
Indian co-owner use and possession rights have been recognized and 
valued over time.  This analysis will demonstrate that both historically 
and currently the intent of both indigenous nations and the federal 
government has been to promote Indian self-determination through 
Indian use of Indian land.  Part IV also shows, however, that many 
federal actions in the twentieth century had perverse effects that did limit 
some owner’s use rights.  Picking up with regulatory changes in 2001 
                                                          
 
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, § 101, 124 Stat. 3064, 3066–
70; Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, 
and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609 (2011). 
 17.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INITIAL IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: LAND BUY-BACK 
PROGRAM FOR TRIBAL NATIONS 8 (2012), https://www.iltf.org/sites/default/files/Buy-
Back%20Initial-Implementation-Plan.pdf [hereinafter BUY-BACK PLAN] (“[D]espite the size of the 
Fund, the Fund may not supply sufficient capital to purchase all fractional interests across Indian 
country.”).  Moreover, the plan applies only to willing sellers, and “it is not clear how many of the 
219,000 individual owners will be interested in selling their fractional interests.”  Id. at 8.  There is 
also a time limit that precludes any purchases after 10 years.  Id.  There are also concerns that, as 
developed, costs of appraisals and other transaction costs could consume a significant portion of the 
funds.  Id. at 11 n.8. 
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and 2013, Part V analyzes the modern rule of no co-owner possession 
without a lease.  Finally, Part VI identifies and addresses the particular 
challenges created by the current tenure system.  This section concludes 
that the very property reforms originally intended to incentivize 
individual Indians’ development of their own private properties have 
instead had the opposite effect, creating undue barriers to enterprise and 
self-determination in Indian Country.  This article concludes that future 
co-ownership rules should be designed at the tribal level, with federal 
support, and with an emphasis on careful, locally driven modifications to 
the current co-ownership form to permit more diverse arrangements for 
land management and use among co-owners. 
II. DESIGN OF CO-OWNERSHIP RULES 
Where more than one owner has rights to concurrent ownership of 
the same land, the default property rules for these co-ownership 
arrangements outside of the Indian law context are relatively well-
settled.18  Whether the property is held in a tenancy in common, a joint 
tenancy with rights of survivorship, or a more specialized tenancy by 
entirety for married persons, the defining characteristic is that all co-
owners, regardless of the size of their fractional share, have an undivided 
right to possess the whole property.19  Co-owners share most of the other 
benefits and burdens of their co-ownership in proportion to their 
respective interests in the property.  For example, each co-owner is 
ultimately responsible for a pro rata share of the carrying cost of the 
property and, likewise, is entitled to a pro rata share of the value when it 
is sold.20  Co-owners are also entitled to a pro rata share of most other 
income derived from the property, whether from extracting natural 
resources or leasing the property to third parties who pay rent for its 
use.21  But with respect to possession and use of land by co-owners 
themselves,  “no matter how small [an individual’s] fractional interest, 
each [co-owner] is entitled to full possessory rights in every part of [the 
property], subject only to fellow co-tenants’ identical rights of 
possession.”22 
                                                          
 18.  See generally 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.01–.09 (Michael 
Allen Wolf ed., 2013). 
 19.  Id. § 50.01[1] at 4; see also 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common §§ 1, 26 (2014). 
 20.  86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common §§ 1, 90. 
 21.  2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.14 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). 
 22.  Evelyn A. Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Co-tenant Possession 
Value Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331, 347; see also 7 POWELL, 
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This undivided right to possess the whole property is important and 
broad.  A co-owner in possession of jointly-owned land, under these 
default rules, need not get any kind of consent or permission from her co-
owners before taking that possession.23  In addition, in most jurisdictions, 
when a single co-owner initiates sole and exclusive possession of the 
entire property and the remaining co-owners make no attempt to use the 
property simultaneously, the in-tenant in possession is not liable to her 
absent co-owners for any kind of rent for her ongoing use of their jointly 
owned land.24  The in-tenant is really exercising her own property right 
to possess the whole and is not required to pay for that exercise where 
the other co-owners fail to make use of their own rights.25  In some cases, 
courts also explain this no-rent rule based on the legal conception that all 
the co-owners in a joint tenancy, for example, are really just one single 
legal owner. 26   Thus, possession by one co-owner is conceived as 
equivalent to possession by all of the co-owners.27 
The rights of a co-owner to use the property without compensating 
the other co-owners are limited only in a case where a co-owner receives 
actual rental income from a third party for leasing out the property.28  A 
co-owner does typically have to share actual rental proceeds with his co-
owners, even though he could have used the same land himself directly 
as a co-owner without a rent requirement if he did not interfere with any 
other co-owner’s actual use.29 
                                                          
 
supra note 18, § 50.01[1]. 
 23.  W.W. Allen, Annotation, Accountability of Cotenants for Rents and Profits or Use and 
Occupation, 51 A.L.R.2d 388 § 9 (1957) (updated 2014); see also 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and 
Joint Ownership § 115 (2014). 
 24.  7 POWELL, supra note 18, § 50.03[1][a]; Allen, supra note 23, §§ 2, 7[a]; CORNELIUS 
MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN’S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
283 (4th ed. 2005) (“All of the cotenants are free to enjoy their ownership and the non-occupying co-
owners should not, by abstaining from the exercise of their right to possession, be able to convert the 
status of the occupying tenant from that of co-owner to rent paying tenant.”). 
 25.  See ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL (West 
6th ed. 2010). 
 26.  E.g., Swafford v. Brasher, 22 So.2d 24, 25 (Ala. 1945) (“The possession of one tenant in 
common is prima facie presumed to be the possession of all . . . .”). 
 27.  86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 27 (2014); see also Swafford, 246 Ala. at 638; Big Run 
Coal & Clay Co. v. Helton, 323 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959) (“The possession of one 
cotenant is presumptively the possession of all and inures to the benefit of all.”); Shives v. 
Niewoehner, 191 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Iowa 1971) (“The possession of one tenant in common is 
presumed to be for the benefit of all, and will, in the absence of statute to the contrary, be regarded 
as the possession of all cotenants . . . .”). 
 28.  2 AMERICAN PROPERTY, supra note 21, § 6.14. 
 29.  7 POWELL, supra note 18, § 50.04[1], at 22; Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P.2d 73, 75 (Cal. 
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For this and other reasons, some scholars have critiqued the rule that 
a single co-owner in possession need not compensate the out-of-
possession co-owners for the value of her own use and possession of the 
jointly owned land.30  These critics have suggested, for example, that the 
non-possessing co-owners may be entitled to some measure of 
compensation from the in-tenant out of fairness for her exclusive use and 
possession of their land, even if she is a fellow co-owner.31  However, 
although the possibility of a rent requirement has been debated, and in a 
minority of jurisdictions adopted,32 the fundamental right of possession is 
left largely unquestioned, probably for the same reason that possession 
itself is deemed one of the most important sticks in the property rights 
bundle.33  Without the right to possess one’s own property, it hardly 
seems like property at all.  And for co-ownership of property to mean 
something, it must include the right to possess the property, at least in 
parallel with other co-owners.34 
The Supreme Court, for example, has underlined this point by 
emphasizing that “property law has long protected an owner’s 
expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the 
possession of his property.”35  The Supreme Court has also emphasized 
that any permanent physical occupation of another’s property “does not 
                                                          
 
Ct. App. 1936); see also Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal. 361, 368 (1860). 
 30.  E.g., Lewis, supra note 22, at 352, 419 (“[A]n in-tenant’s exclusive use of cotenancy 
property is a combination of actual possession on his own behalf and representational possession of 
the interest attributable to the out-tenant.  Given this, it is anomalous and intellectually inconsistent 
to say that the unity of possession concept requires value accountability for representational 
possession through a third-party stranger to the cotenancy, but prevents such value accountability 
when the representational possession is achieved through a non-stranger cotenant.”); Lawrence 
Berger, An Analysis of the Economic Relations Between Cotenants, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1015 (1979). 
 31.  Lewis, supra note 22, at 418. 
 32.  Id. at app. (listing minority of states that have adopted a default rent requirement for co-
owner use); see also Cohen v. Cohen, 106 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ohio 1952).  It is also worth noting that, 
although not requiring rent per se, in many cases courts will require an in-tenant in sole possession to 
pay an increased or disproportionate share of the carrying or maintenance costs of the property, up to 
and including the value of that tenant’s possession itself.  See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN PROPERTY, supra 
note 21, § 6.17, at 76. 
 33.  Honoré, supra note 4, at 113 (arguing that “[u]nless a legal system provides some rules and 
procedures for attaining [the right to possess] it cannot be said to protect ownership”). 
 34.  Others have characterized this by stating that the distinctive feature of property is the right 
to exclude others—to take possession yourself and prevent others from doing so.  In the case of co-
ownership, co-owners generally can exclude non-owners, but not other co-owners, because all co-
owners have an essential right to possession of the whole.  James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary 
Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 144 (2009) (“If nobody has a 
right to exclude, there is no property.”). 
 35.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). 
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simply take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it 
chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand” because the 
owner neither has the right to possess the occupied space himself nor to 
exclude the occupier from the possession and use of that space.36  The 
Supreme Court has also framed the importance of a landowner’s right to 
exclude non-owners—which is really the right to possess the property 
while prohibiting outsiders from taking possession of the property—as 
“one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property . . . .”37 
As a practical matter, obvious challenges and conflicts can arise 
when co-owners share the same right to possess (simultaneously) the 
whole.  As one court evocatively described, “[t]wo men cannot plow the 
same furrow.”38  Thus, two key remedies have been created for disputes 
among co-owners in the common law: partition and ouster.  Partition 
gives every co-owner in a tenancy in common or joint tenancy the right 
to bring an action to force physical division of co-tenancy property so 
that each co-owner can have sole ownership of a separate, divided piece 
of property. 39   If physical in-kind partition is not feasible under the 
circumstances, the court may force a sale of the property and division of 
the proceeds among former co-owners in proportion to the economic 
interests held.40  This unilateral right to force a partition provides an 
absolute right to exit from the joint ownership.41 
Ouster is a narrower remedy, short of partition, for co-owners who 
disagree about how the property should be used.  If a co-owner in 
possession actually excludes another co-owner from taking shared 
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 435. 
 37.  Kaister Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).  Certainly, this does not mean 
that property requires absolute rights to exclude.  See, e.g., Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980) (private shopping mall may not exclude certain protesters exercising protected rights 
to speech); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (private farmer employing and housing migrant 
farmworkers may not exclude specialized service providers who are “essential” to those workers’ 
“health, welfare, or dignity”). 
 38.  Mastbaum v. Mastbaum, 9 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. Ch. 1939). 
 39.  7 POWELL, supra note 18, § 50.07[1], at 37. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  See id.; 4 JAMES A. BLACKMUN ET AL., THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 30.02, at 82 
(David A. Thomas ed., 2004); Waldeck, supra note 11, at 737; Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced 
Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 610 (2010).  The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also addressed the subject by 
completing the Partition of Heirs Property Act, which as of this writing has been enacted in three 
states and is being considered in four more.  See generally Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. 
LAW. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org /Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of%20Heirs%20Property 
%20Act (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (describing the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act and 
noting the status of its enactment across the United States). 
2014] NO STICKS IN MY BUNDLE 393 
possession of the property—that is, physically prevents another co-owner 
from actual efforts to use or possess any part of the land—there may be 
sufficient evidence of “ouster.”42  Typically, to find ouster there must be 
evidence that the non-possessing co-owner “actually sought to occupy 
the [property] but was prevented from moving in by [the possessing co-
owner].”43  In most jurisdictions, this requires more than just a demand 
from other co-owners to vacate the property or pay rent for its use.44  If 
there is ouster, the remedy is to require the possessing co-owner to pay a 
fair-market rental value to the excluded co-owners.45 
The combined effect of these joint ownership rules is to reward and 
encourage productive use of property by the owners themselves.46  An 
industrious co-owner can take complete possession of jointly owned land 
without any obligation to get prior permission for his use or possession 
from his co-owners, 47  and if the other absentee co-owners make no 
parallel effort to use and possess the land themselves (and therefore are 
never deemed to be “ousted” by the in-tenant), the industrious in-tenant 
has no obligation to compensate his co-owners for his use.48  However, 
an in-tenant who makes direct use of the land itself is rewarded not only 
with free rent to the entire property but also with some protection in 
partition or other accounting or contribution proceedings.  For example, 
if an in-tenant has individually improved the property or is in current 
possession of the property, that history of productive use and possession, 
and personal attachment to the land, is typically considered and, where 
                                                          
 42.  MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 24, at 282 (“Since each of the tenants is entitled to 
possession of the entire property subject to a reciprocal right in his cotenants, if one of the tenants 
excludes the others from the possession or enjoyment of the whole or any part of the land, his 
conduct amounts to an ouster and an action of ejectment will lie in favor of the excluded tenants.”). 
 43.  Spiller v. Mackereth, 334 So. 2d 859, 862 (Ala. 1976). 
 44.  See Allen, supra note 23, § 9; see also MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 24, at 282 (“Sole 
possession by the occupying tenant . . . without more, is not ouster.  There must be a repudiation of 
the rights of the cotenants and a claim of sole ownership; otherwise, the cotenants may properly 
assume that the possession of the occupying tenant is not hostile to their interests.”). 
 45.  7 POWELL, supra note 18, § 50.03[1][a], at 15–16. 
 46.  The wisdom of encouraging owners to use their own land, especially for farming, rather 
than leasing it to third parties, has theoretical support.  See, e.g., DAVID J. PETERS, MO. ECON. RES. 
& INFO. CTR., TECHNICAL PAPER P-0702-1, REVISITING THE GOLDSCHMIDT HYPOTHESIS: THE 
EFFECT OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ON SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE RURAL MIDWEST 7–8 
(2002) (summarizing social science demonstrating rural communities dominated by locally owned, 
moderate-sized farms consistently have better socioeconomic well-being across multiple indicators 
than communities with agriculture dominated by large, corporate or absentee farm ownership). 
 47.  Co-owners cannot, of course, commit waste or unreasonably prejudice the interests of co-
owners.  See generally 7 POWELL, supra note 18, §§ 56.01–56.12; see also infra Part VI.A.1. 
 48.  This is not the same if he merely leases the property to a third party.  See supra note 29 and 
accompanying text. 
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possible, accounted for in the ultimate distribution of land or other 
monetary proceeds from the land.49 
III. WHY OWNER’S USE RIGHTS MATTER 
The situation in nearly every Indian community today is essentially 
the opposite of the default rules for other co-owners of property.  Co-
owners of individually owned Indian trust land no longer have a direct, 
undivided right to possess their property.  Nor can they possess some 
proportionate share of their land.  Instead, an Indian co-owner must 
execute a formal lease, or otherwise get actual prior permission from all 
of their co-owners, and often approval from the BIA, before taking 
possession.  They must also pay those other co-owners fair-market-value 
rent (as determined by the BIA, typically after a lengthy appraisal 
process) in exchange for that possession.  There is no parallel functioning 
partition remedy to exit the property unilaterally and directly, and in 
effect, all co-owners are “ousted” from their jointly owned property by 
the Department of Interior’s property rules themselves.50 
In 2001, the Department of Interior promulgated the first regulation 
openly declaring that only an “Indian landowner who owns 100 percent 
of the trust or restricted interests in a tract” is allowed to “take possession 
without a lease or any other prior authorization from [the BIA].” 51  In 
                                                          
 49.  7 POWELL, supra note 18, § 50.04[2], at 24; 4 BLACKMUN, supra note 41, § 32.07(b), at 
102.  The in-tenant, however, may have to pay more of the costs of carrying and maintaining the 
property, and in that way offset somewhat his “free use” of the co-owners’ shares of the land.  Id. 
 50.  In 2004, Congress did authorize a partition sale option for some “highly fractionated Indian 
lands,” but partition has a different meaning here, which illustrates again some of the complexity of 
the Indian trust bureaucracy.  25 U.S.C. § 2204(c) (2012).  Instead of providing a unilateral exit 
right, with a preference for partition in kind, the current partition sale rules provide for a particular 
kind of forced sale of highly fractionated parcels after a detailed application process, consent from at 
least 50 percent of co-ownership interests in the land, and a mandatory appraisal.  Id.  The sale must 
also take place at an auction with limits on who qualifies for potential bidding and with the caveat 
that the final price at auction must be at least the appraised value.  Id.  This cumbersome practice 
rarely occurs in practice.  Diane K. Lautt, The American Indian Probate Reform Act: A Five-Year 
Review, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 105, 119–20 (2011).  In addition, the Department of Interior technically 
does have some other in-kind partition authority, but it is outdated and also rarely used.  See 
generally 2012 COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 1085–86; see also 25 C.F.R. § 152.33 (2014) 
(discussing different partition procedures for “competent” versus “incompetent” co-owners); 25 
U.S.C. §§ 372, 378, 483 (2012); see also S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 2 (2000) (“Even when partition [in 
kind] is a legal option, it is rarely a practical alternative.”); Walker v. Great Plains Reg’l Dir., Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 57 I.B.I.A. 167, 169, 174–77 (2013) (discussing federal legal authority for 
partition in kind of trust allotments in context of a nearly 20-year (and still unsuccessful) effort by 
one individual co-owner to have a pro-rata share of his allotment interest partitioned to him). 
 51.  25 C.F.R. §§ 162.104(a), 166.200 (2002).  However, in some instances, even a sole owner 
still needs BIA permission to make certain uses of his or her own land.  See, e.g., Koontz v. Nw. 
Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 55 I.B.I.A. 177, 185 (2012) (“Indeed, even where a trust 
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2013, the Department expanded the application of this no-possession rule 
to say that before a co-owner could possess her own land she must have a 
formal BIA-approved lease or some other form of unanimous permission 
from all of her co-owners.52  Unauthorized possession, even by a co-
owner, would be—and is—treated as trespass by the BIA.53 
These rules create perverse results where individual Indian 
landowners are precluded from making actual use of their own land—
whether for housing, farming, gardening, grazing, business, or other 
purposes.  As just one example, at the Pine Ridge Reservation in South 
Dakota, approximately 1 million of the 1.7 million reservation acres are 
still owned by individual Indians. 54   Despite this significant land 
resource, Pine Ridge had the poorest census tract in the nation and an 
unemployment rate of 73 percent.55  A year after President Clinton’s visit 
in 1999 to announce additional federal support, there were still 
approximately 1200 families on a waiting list for housing on the Pine 
Ridge Reservation.56  More recently, when a group of three Pine Ridge 
families successfully started a sustainable buffalo ranching cooperative 
on the reservation, they expressly desired to expand their operation to 
include more Pine Ridge families.  Despite market demand for such an 
expansion, this growth was precluded due, at least in part, to the 
                                                          
 
allotment is owned entirely by one individual, that individual must also secure approval from BIA 
for any harvest on the allotment if the forest products will be sold.”); see also 25 C.F.R. § 163.27 
(2014) (requiring BIA approval even for harvest of forest products for personal use). 
 52.  25 C.F.R. § 162.005 (2014). 
 53.  Id. § 162.003 (defining trespass as “any unauthorized occupancy, use of, or action on any 
Indian land or Government land”).  But see id. § 162.106 and infra note 256 and accompanying text 
for possible special rules for agricultural leases.  The BIA also in some instances exercises more 
flexibility in how a “trespassing” co-owner is treated.  E.g., Goodwin v. Pac. Reg’l Dir., Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 44 I.B.I.A. 25, 29–30 (2006) (holding that co-owner in trespass need not be 
immediately evicted from premises but rather BIA could elect to allow co-owner to remain in 
possession while a possible residential lease is considered). 
 54.  VILLAGE EARTH, PINE RIDGE RESERVATION ALLOTTEE LAND-PLANNING MAP BOOK 3 
[hereinafter PINE RIDGE MAP BOOK], https://www.iltf.org/sites/default/files /pine_ridge_map 
_book.pdf; see also Pine Ridge Land Information System, VILLAGE EARTH, 
http://www.lakotalands.net/prlis (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 55.  Clinton Visits Indian Reservation, NEWSDAY, July 8, 1999, at A07. 
 56.  U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SHARED VISIONS: PINE RIDGE, A YEAR LATER 
SHARING THE DREAM 12 (2000), http://archives.hud.gov/reports/pineridge/sharedvisions.pdf.  In 
2013, the Chief Executive Officer of Oglala Sioux (Lakota) Housing agency on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation told the Senate Indian Affairs Committee that Pine Ridge needs at least 4,000 new 
housing units to meet community needs.  Identifying Barriers to Indian Housing Development and 
Finding Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 30–33 (2013) 
(statement of Paul Iron Cloud, Chief Executive Officer, Oglala Sioux (Lakota) Housing, Pine Ridge 
Reservation). 
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ranchers’ lack of access to their own lands for grazing.57  Instead, a small 
group of just 20 people lease 46 percent of Pine Ridge Indian lands 
through the BIA’s leasing program, 58  and individual landowners are 
effectively prohibited from accessing their own jointly owned lands 
without a lease.59 
The experience on Pine Ridge reflects the general experience in 
many Indian communities.  Although roughly 56 million acres of Indian 
land remain within Indian reservation boundaries today, and more than 
10 million of these acres are owned by individual Indians in this trust 
status,60 extreme poverty persists in many Indian communities.61  The 
vast majority of Indian land is agricultural,62 and agriculture provides one 
of the best non-gaming opportunities for growth of tribal economies.63  
Yet, Indians themselves do not typically use these agricultural lands.  
Only 16 percent of the $1.6 billion worth of agricultural commodities 
produced on Indian reservations in 2007 went to Native farmers and 
                                                          
 57.  See Alleen Brown, This Land is Our Land, IN THESE TIMES (July 12, 2011), 
http://www.iatp.org/documents/landowners-without-land; see also Lakota Buffalo Caretakers 
Cooperative, VILLAGE EARTH, http://villageearth.org/global-affiliates/lakota-buffalo-caretakers-
association (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 58.  PINE RIDGE MAP BOOK, supra note 54, at 3. 
 59.  See infra Part V. 
 60.  BUY-BACK PLAN, supra note 17, at 5; see also GEORGE L. RUSSEL, AMERICAN INDIAN 
DIGEST 30 (1993) (approximately 300 federally recognized reservations include 55 million acres of 
Indian-owned land; 44 million acres are held in trust for the tribe, while the remaining 11 are 
individually owned). 
 61.  U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS 
IN INDIAN COUNTRY ix (2003) [hereinafter QUIET CRISIS], http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703 
/na0731.pdf.  For example, the United States Commission on Civil Rights has concluded that 
“Native Americans continue to rank at or near the bottom of nearly every social, health, and 
economic indicator,” compared to other groups in American society, suffering “higher rates of 
poverty, poor educational achievement, substandard housing, and higher rates of disease and 
illness.”  Id. 
 62.  RUSSEL, supra note 60, at 30 (stating that of the 55 million acres of land contained within 
federally recognized Indian reservations, 44 million Indian acres are range and grazing lands, 5.3 
million acres are commercial forest, and 2.5 million acres are crop lands); Darla J. Mondou, The 
American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act: Does the Winters Water Bucket Have a 
Hole in It?, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 381, 387 (1998) (stating 75 percent of Indian land is agricultural); 
Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1066 n.3 (2008) 
(reporting that “more than 43 million acres of tribal lands are range and grazing land, and another 
2.5 million acres are ‘crop areas’”). 
 63.  See S. REP. No. 103-186, at 2 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2459, 2460 (finding 
that “[t]he farming and ranching sector provides the main source of entrepreneurial opportunity to 
the Indian people within Indian reservations and communities”); see also William Parker, 
Agriculture, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ECONOMIST’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 409 (Lance Davis et al. eds., 1972). 
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ranchers.64  The Department of Interior recently estimated that half of 
all the jointly owned individual Indian land on reservations was idle or 
“generated no income” from 2006 to 2011.65 
Meanwhile, fresh food is in short supply on many reservations,66 as 
is housing 67  and employment. 68   When the Indian Land Tenure 
Foundation (ILTF) conducted surveys to measure “how Indian people 
view . . . land ownership and management,” ILTF discovered that 
“overall, the respondents [74.31 percent of them] perceived Indian 
control and management of land as having the most importance in 
securing a better life for future generations and tribal sovereignty.”69  
However, the survey revealed that “in reality, property rights are not, or 
cannot be, used effectively in Indian country.  In other words, the 
respondents perceived great systemic barriers in the use of property 
rights related to land and natural resources.”70 
                                                          
 64.  Raymond Cross, Keeping the American Indian Rancher on the Land: A Socio-Legal 
Analysis of the Rise and the Demise of American Indian Ranching on the Northern Great Plains, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 745, 769–70 (2010); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 
AMERICAN INDIAN FARMERS 1, 3 (2009) [hereinafter 2007 CENSUS]. 
 65.  BUY-BACK PLAN, supra note 17, at 5–6. 
 66.  See, e.g., Kelly Gibson, Fresh Food for Food Deserts, NAT’L RELIEF CHARITIES BLOG 
(Aug. 5, 2011), http://blog.nrcprograms.org/fresh-food-in-food-deserts (describing charitable efforts 
to provide fruits and vegetables to isolated reservations); Steph Larsen, Welcome to the Food 
Deserts of Rural America, GRIST.ORG (Jan. 22, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://grist.org/article/2011-01-21-
welcome-to-the-food-deserts-of-rural-america (describing one experience of a food desert on Omaha 
Indian Reservation in Nebraska).  Compare Food Access Research Atlas, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 
ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (May 28, 2014), http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/food-access-
research-atlas/go-to-the-atlas.aspx#.UyYms3lNxBU, with Indian Reservations in the Continental 
United States, NAT’L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/ 
nagpra/DOCUMENTS/RESERV.PDF (last visited Nov. 20, 2014). 
 67.  Despite relatively widespread landownership, less than a third of Native Americans own 
homes (compared to two-thirds of all Americans).  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-
654, NATIVE AMERICAN HOUSING: VA COULD ADDRESS SOME BARRIERS TO PARTICIPATION IN 
DIRECT LOAN PROGRAM (2002).  HUD has also estimated that housing shortages for Indian families 
increased 40 percent from 2003 to 2012.  See Identifying Barriers to Indian Housing Development 
and Finding Solutions: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 1 
(2013) (statement of Cheryl H. Causley, Chairwoman, National American Indian Tribal Council). 
 68.  QUIET CRISIS, supra note 61.  More recent reports have suggested unemployment for 
Indians who live on reservations may be “nearly ten times that for the nation as a whole.”  Gavin 
Clarkson, Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private Equity into Indian Country as 
a Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 285, 287 (2009). 
 69.  Community Survey: Importance and Value of Property Rights, 2003 INDIAN LAND TENURE 
FOUND. 1, 3–4, available at https://www.iltf.org/sites/default/files/community_survey_2003.pdf.  
Only 44.5 percent said property rights “work for Indians.”  Id.  Only 15.1 percent thought their 
property rights were secure and respected by federal and state governments, and 16.1 percent 
perceived information about property rights as “accessible and understandable.”  Id. at 4. 
 70.  Id. 
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Previously, I have argued that the extreme fractionation on Indian 
lands, combined with the correspondingly restrictive federal trust status 
over these lands, has caused what I termed a “constructive 
dispossession” within Indian Country, with Indian landowners retaining 
few, if any, of the beneficial aspects of property ownership under these 
conditions.71  Other property scholars in the anticommons literature have 
also pointed to the under-utilization of these lands and blamed the 
problem on a presumed presence of too many property rights, and 
therefore too many transaction costs, for individual owners to choose to 
invest in their own land’s use. 72   Certainly, the extreme degree of 
fractionation and the burdensome federal trust status do impede land use.  
However, Indian landowners’ lack of any direct use and possession 
rights is at least another significant—and overlooked—factor.  
Fractionation and the trust bureaucracy are two important elements of the 
Indian land tenure dilemma; the actual design of owners’ legal rights and 
entitlements is the critical third point in the triangle.  In other words, it is 
not only that Indian landowners suffer a constructive dispossession 
because of an on the ground over-crowding and over-bureaucratization 
of small interests.  Rather, current Department of Interior rules now 
effectuate a legal dispossession, too.  It is not merely inconvenient for 
Indian landowners to use and possess their lands.  In many cases, it is 
also illegal. 
This legal dispossession is not explained away by some kind of 
special wrinkle of federal Indian law and history.  Instead, the opposite is 
true.  Historically, individual Indian property rights, especially individual 
Indian possession rights, were recognized and even promoted by the 
federal government. 73   Congress, more recently, continues to pass 
legislation seeking to increase Indian landowners’ use and control of 
their land.74  The Supreme Court has also held that, even in the cases of 
the most extreme fractionation, Indian landowners retain valid protected 
private property rights in these tiny interests, and even just one “stick” in 
the individual Indian landowners’ property rights “bundle”—the right to 
devise these small interests—could not be eliminated, or overly 
                                                          
 71.  Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 730 & n.5; see also Sawers, supra note 9, at 404 
(incorporating term); see also Indian Land Consolidation Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs on S. 1340, 117th Cong. 34 (2002) (statement of Austin Nunez, Chair of Indian Land 
Working Group) (telling Senate Indian Affairs Committee that Indian landowners “will no longer 
stand” for the experience of being “detached from our lands as your laws have tried to make us”). 
 72.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See, e.g., infra Part IV.A. 
 74.  See infra Part IV.A.3–4, IV.C. 
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restricted, without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 75  
Nonetheless, the default co-ownership rules have changed inversely to 
prohibit direct individual use.  In order to appreciate the significance of 
this change, the next section analyzes the repeated reaffirmations of the 
importance of individual use and possession rights by the federal 
government and the strength of these rights historically.  Although 
European contact, discovery, and the conquest story all had a massive 
dispossession effect on Indian owners of Indian land as huge swaths of 
Indian property and territory transferred to non-Indian ownership and 
control, the legislation of the last century and a half points to a 
Congressional preference for (or at least policy of non-interference with) 
Indian possessors and users of remaining Indian land. 
IV. THE EBB AND FLOW OF INDIAN OWNER’S USE 
Prior to contact with Europeans, individual Indians’ rights in land 
were defined by the hundreds of different indigenous nations that existed 
on this continent. 76   Each of these nations had their own internal, 
functioning institutions for the organization and management of 
individual property rights.77  This section provides an overview of these 
indigenous land tenure systems, with a focus on how they valued 
individual use rights, and then analyzes the evolution of these rights 
following Indian nations’ contact with Europeans.  At least on the lands 
that Indian nations retained after contact, the federal government has 
repeatedly recognized and even promoted strong individual use and 
possession rights.  Although some individual Indian landowners certainly 
experienced challenges in exercising these use and possession rights, and 
intermittent agency actions limited some of these rights to some degree, 
the overall theme is preference and protection for owner’s use and 
possession rights in Indian lands. 
                                                          
 75.  Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717–18 
(1987). 
 76.  See generally Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868 (Aug. 10, 2012) (current listing of 566 federally recognized 
Indian tribes). 
 77.  See also Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth 
of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001); Leeds, Burning, supra note 10, at 493; 
John C. Hoelle, Comment, Re-Evaluating Tribal Customs of Land Use Rights, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 
551 (2011). 
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A. Prior Possession 
1. Indigenous Systems of Individual Use 
The nuances of indigenous property law institutions varied by tribe, 
and they were necessarily informed by both the unique landscape in 
which each tribe was located and basic differences in social structures, 
such as whether a given tribe engaged primarily in settled farming or 
more nomadic hunting.  Generally speaking, most of these indigenous 
property law institutions included at least some allocations of individual 
use rights.  Although sometimes generalized in collective understanding 
as a historic communal or commons-ownership regime, in fact most 
original (pre-European contact) tribal land tenure systems consisted of 
indigenous institutions for the allocation of individual use and occupancy 
rights to tribal members based on an individual’s actual, continuous use 
of a particular piece of land.78  Thus, indigenous tenure was based not on 
true commons systems but instead on systems of individual use and 
occupancy rights, with individual Indians enjoying specific rights in land 
as perfected by actual use.79  These individual use and occupancy rights, 
generally, would revert back to the tribe upon abandonment by the 
individual property holder.80  For example, early accounts of the Omaha 
Tribe in Nebraska report institutions for family-based gardening and 
farming that provided for undisturbed ownership and occupancy of tracts 
of lands for as long as a family cultivated that land.81  This came with a 
collective understanding that such land would become free for use by 
other tribal members again only once the tract had been abandoned for a 
season.82 
To the extent there was shared ownership or shared rights to use a 
given piece of property (e.g., where multiple family members jointly 
farmed a particular plot of land), these indigenous tribal property systems 
                                                          
 78.  Hoelle, supra note 77, at 559–60.  Almost all Indian property systems permitted tribal 
citizens to transfer their individual use and possession rights within the tribe but prohibited transfers 
outside of the tribe without tribal leaders’ permission.  Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1572.  This 
restriction on alienation outside the tribe “led many outsiders, including nineteenth and twentieth-
century reformers, to conclude that title to Indian lands was invariably held by the tribe in common,” 
but this was not true.  Id.; see also CARLSON, supra note 1, at 85. 
 79.  History of the Allotment Policy: Hearings on H.R. 7902 on the Readjustment of Indian 
Affairs Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong. 431 (1934) (statement of D.S. Otis) 
[hereinafter Otis]. 
 80.  Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1584. 
 81.  ADDISON E. SHELDON, LAND SYSTEMS AND LAND POLICIES IN NEBRASKA: A HISTORY OF 
NEBRASKA LAND 5 (1936). 
 82.  Id. 
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also included “basic rules” by which these jointly owned lands were 
managed among the co-owners. 83   For example, in the Cherokee 
tradition, Dean Stacy Leeds has reported that these internal “rules” 
provided preferences for the decisions of active owners who remained 
physically connected to the land.84  They also imposed a requirement that 
any co-owners who permanently moved away from the area or no longer 
maintained a meaningful contact with the property would sell or gift their 
interests to another remaining active co-owner.85  Indeed, any sale offers 
were made to co-tenants or other Indian family members, not to 
outsiders, and one co-tenant could not change the land’s use without 
consensus of the other active co-owners.86 
2. Discovery and Recognized Occupancy Rights 
Of course, European contact with indigenous nations resulted in a 
fundamental restructuring of Indian land tenure patterns.  These changes 
started at a macro level with the introduction of European settlers 
causing a shift of tribal territorial boundaries—and therefore an actual 
geographic change to location and size of particular landholdings.  Over 
time, however, European contact changed not just the map of where 
tribal landholdings were located but also the internal allocations of 
individuals’ rights to these lands.  Initially, however, the use and 
possession rights of individual Indians were still primarily protected. 
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court concluded that 
“discovery” of the new continent by Europeans resulted in the transition 
of Indian land tenure from its pre-contact fee-like status to an Indian 
“right of occupancy” that was extinguishable only by the new European 
sovereign, either through a purchase between the sovereign European 
nation and the sovereign Indian nation, or by conquest. 87   This 
                                                          
 83.  Leeds, Burning, supra note 10, at 496. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id.  In addition, before allotment, any individual Indian rights in land passed by tribal 
inheritance systems, which varied by tribe.  See, e.g., Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 29 (1899) 
(determining that right to inherit unrestricted land owned by Indian chief “was controlled by the 
laws, usages, and customs of the tribe, and not by the law of the state of Minnesota, nor by any 
action of the Secretary of the Interior”); Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1615; Robert D. Cooter & 
Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian Trial Courts, 
Part II, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 530–35 (1998) (describing various traditional inheritance patterns). 
 87.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 543 (1823); see also LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, 
CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF 
THEIR LANDS 75–76, 100–12 (2005). 
402 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
recognized “right of occupancy” came to be called Indian title. 88  
Although Indians’ overall property rights were diminished by the 
Johnson opinion, the property right at issue in this article—the right to 
occupy (or use and possess) land—was preserved, remaining nearly 
absolute unless and until it was terminated in a subsequent transaction 
endorsed by the federal government.  On the remaining Indian land so 
occupied, tribes continued to allocate use and possession rights to 
individuals as they saw fit.  Indeed, individual Indians’ rights to specific 
tracts post-discovery have been recognized by scholars and courts.89 
Nearly a century of treaty making followed European contact; 
through sovereign-to-sovereign treaty instruments, tribal nations sold or 
traded their occupancy rights to the British and then U.S. government.90  
The Indian nations reserved to themselves in these transactions certain 
defined remaining territories (i.e., “reservations”) for tribal citizens’ 
exclusive use and enjoyment, and title to these reservation lands went 
from the limited “Indian title” (i.e., the right of occupancy subject to 
federal extinguishment only) to a formal “recognized title” that would be 
subject to Fifth Amendment takings remedies if subsequently taken by 
the federal government without just compensation.91  Originally, within 
these reserved territories, tribes could continue to apply (or reform based 
on new circumstances and resource allocations) their internal tenure 
systems for land use and management.92 
                                                          
 88.  Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543. 
 89.  For example, there were early cases in which railroads did recognize that they should 
“compensate individual Indians whose fences, cultivated land, and other improvements had been 
rendered valueless by the railroad” going through traditional Indian lands.  Ronald L. Trosper, The 
Economic Impact of the Allotment Policy on the Flathead Indian Reservation (Aug. 1974) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the D’Arcy Mcnickle Library, 
Salish Kootenai College). 
  Mary and Carrie Dann are another example.  However, because the Dann sisters asserted 
individual property rights outside of recognized tribal territories, it took the Organization of 
American States to affirm their claims when the federal government would not.  See Mary & Carrie 
Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. 1 (Dec. 
27, 2002); Comm. for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Early Warning and Urgent Action 
Procedure, Decision 1 (68), United States of America, U.N. Doc. No. CERD/C/USA/DEC/1 (Apr. 
11, 2006); see also Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and Dann Sisters’ Last Stand: 
American Indian Women’s Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 637 (1999). 
 90.  See generally Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 35 (1947); 2012 
COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 26–29. 
 91.  Compare United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (treaty 
recognized land is recognized title), with Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) 
(absent treaty recognition, mere occupancy right of aboriginal Indian title not subject to Fifth 
Amendment takings liability). 
 92. E.g., Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1615; Leonard A. Carlson, Learning to Farm: Indian Land 
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These original reservation boundaries demarking areas for exclusive 
Indian use did not, however, remain impenetrable. 93   Homesteading 
white farmers and other non-Indian influences grew increasingly anxious 
at seeing reservation lands that were not producing as they thought 
necessary. 94   Demoralized Indian nations increasingly depended on 
rations from the federal government as they lost their historic tribal 
survival mechanisms (such as the annual buffalo hunt), and pressure 
mounted to make the land more productive and the Indians more 
independent.95 
3. Allotment and the Making of Indian Farmers 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the federal government began 
implementing the federal allotment policy by which reformers sought to 
establish Western notions of private ownership within Indian Country 
based on a profound belief in the transformative power of private 
property.  The idea was simple: a formal Western-styled system of 
private property imposed on individual Indians within the reservation 
would break up the tribe as a controlling social influence, encourage 
individualism and self-interest, and promote the progress of autonomous 
Indian farmers.96  These reformers believed that, with the break-up of 
tribal structures, individual Indians would be driven by “enlightened self-
interest” and “would soon want to accumulate wealth and property 
[through farming] and . . . would acquire the habits and customs of 
Christian society.”97 
The idea was that by formalizing individual title to parcels of land—
rather than allocating individual use rights, if at all, through tribal tenure 
systems—the federal government could promote more individualistic 
                                                          
 
Tenure and Farming Before the Dawes Act, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 73–74.  For a 
broader history of the reservation era, see generally 2012 COHEN HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at 60–
64. 
 93.  In addition, reservation boundaries were re-drawn when, for example, the federal 
government pressured tribes for additional treaty cessions or mandated removal and relocation.  See 
generally id. at 41–51. 
 94.  E.g., Otis, supra note 79, at 432. 
 95.  2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND 
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 661–62 (1984). 
 96.  CARLSON, supra note 1, at 79; see also Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1565; Kathleen R. 
Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA 
L. REV. 595, 597 n.3 (2000); Royster, supra note 6, at 9. 
 97.  CARLSON, supra note 1, at 80. 
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behavior by Indians and, in turn, greater exploitation of Indian resources 
by the Indians themselves. 98   Thus, through allotment, the federal 
government imposed a one-size-fits-all version of private property within 
reservations, erased indigenous tenure systems for allocating individual 
rights, and formally redistributed reservation lands to individual Indians 
in parcels ranging on average from 40 to 160 acres in size.99  In 1903, the 
Supreme Court affirmed that the federal government, as an exercise of its 
plenary power over Indians, could execute these land reforms without 
Indian consent.100 
Some of these reformers and allotment advocates did believe that, 
before allotment, reservation lands were purely owned “in common” and 
that allotment was introducing private rights in land for the first time.  
Their contemporaries, however, soon pointed out that the notion of 
Indian tenure as “communism” was largely inaccurate because “the vast 
majority of cases of Indian economic pursuits [were] carried on directly 
with individual rewards in view,” including in the Indian agricultural 
economy specifically.101  This was true as much for Pueblo agriculture, 
which incorporated individualistic farming effort and pooled resources 
only in the care of the irrigation systems, as it was for the annual buffalo 
hunt of the Omaha tribe. 102   By “communism,” allotment advocates 
meant largely that “the title to land invariably vested in the tribe and the 
actual holding of the land was dependent on its use and occupancy.”103 
Indeed, even as allotment was being implemented, there were 
discrete incidents of Indian Office agents recognizing pre-existing tenure 
systems.  For example, in the process of selecting allotments for 
individual Indians, agents “usually recognized” the claims of any Indians 
who had already occupied or improved particular tracts of land. 104  
Furthermore, disputes sometimes arose when the federal government 
deemed certain lands subject to allotment that in fact were subject to 
prior individual indigenous claims.105  For example, on the Pine Ridge 
reservation in 1904, the allotting agent reported that his allotment 
                                                          
 98.  Otis, supra note 79, at 431. 
 99.  COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § C(2)(d), at 132–34 (Rennard Strickland 
et al. eds., 1982 ed.) [hereinafter 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK]; see also Royster, supra note 6, at 10–12. 
 100.  See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567–68 (1903) (finding Indian consent not 
required for allotment). 
 101.  Otis, supra note 79, at 431. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 104.  JANET A. MCDONNELL, DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 7–8, 1887–1934 
(1991). 
 105.  Id. at 22–23. 
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process was being hampered by individuals claiming prior rights to 
certain desirable land along creeks and by the fact that as many as four 
families might live on the same section at the time of allotment.106  In 
some instances, the agent worked to convince individuals to agree to 
arrangements that would allow them to keep their original home and 
water but then to take the balance of their allotment elsewhere, resulting 
in the scattering of many families. 107   Similarly, the Palm Springs 
reservation agent struggled to implement allotment in 1922 after Indians 
had been living and farming there peacefully for 36 years.108  Individual 
Indians objected that the allotments would not only separate families but 
would “disturb the orchards that they had carefully nurtured for years.”109 
Nonetheless, allotment did proceed on most reservations,110 and on 
the allotments that were made, individuals were to own their squares of 
property privately, but not in a straightforward fee simple.  Instead, 
initial allotments were placed in a new, specially designed trust status 
through which the federal government would act as a trustee overseeing 
the individual’s land management choices for an initial probationary 
period.111 
Importantly, this trust status was designed to “protect” individual 
parcels of land while the Indian allottees completed their intended 
transformation to farmers. 112   While a common real estate trust 
arrangement today might contemplate a trustee taking possession of the 
trust corpus or res and then managing it directly on behalf of the absentee 
beneficiary, this initial federal trust protection of Indian lands was 
designed for an entirely different purpose.113  Allotment was intended, 
instead, to promote Indian enterprise by Indian landowners on Indians’ 
                                                          
 106.  Id. at 22. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id.  The policy at Palm Springs at least was ultimately softened so that only Indians who 
wanted an allotment would receive one, and each Indian was guaranteed a minimum of irrigable 
acres.  Id. at 24. 
 110.  By 1934, 118 of the 213 reservations at that time had been allotted.  OFFICE OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Indian Land Tenure, Economic Status, and Population 
Trends, in SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE LAND PLANNING COMMITTEE TO THE NATIONAL 
RESOURCES BOARD pt. 10, at 5 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 LAND PLANNING]. 
 111.  General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, § 5 (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2012)). 
 112.  See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 113.  Cf. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 352–55 (6th ed. 1987) (describing traditional trustee 
duties to take possession of the trust res and noting “rare cases” where “the beneficiary is permitted 
by the trust instrument to have possession of the trust property . . . .”). 
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own lands. 114  As Senator Dawes himself articulated, the goal was for an 
individual Indian to “own the land he cultivates.”115  While in trust, the 
allottee had an individual “right of use and enjoyment” in the allotment 
that would become “absolute ownership” upon the removal of the trust 
status and conveyance of a fee patent.116  An allottee also acquired, by 
virtue of his allotment, “full possessory rights with respect to the 
improvements and the timber upon his allotment, as well as the minerals 
beneath it.”117 
The original trust status for allotments did impose a federal restraint 
on alienation intended to prohibit improvident transfers to Indians or 
non-Indians while the allottee was becoming “competent” to own and 
use the land directly without the trust status protections.118  In addition, 
as originally designed, this trust status also denied individual Indian 
allottees the right to determine, through devise or other tribal inheritance 
institutions, who received the allotment after death. 119   Thus, in the 
period immediately following allotment, the trust status of Indian lands 
prohibited any transfer of trust title during life or any individual or tribal 
control of the transfer of the allotment after the allottee’s death.120  The 
one thing these allottees did retain, however, was strong use and 
possession rights.  They could use, possess, and exclude others from the 
allotment as they saw fit, as long as it did not result in a threat to the 
security of the title (like a mortgage, for example). 
                                                          
 114.  Otis, supra note 79, at 430. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220 (1941) [hereinafter 1941 
HANDBOOK]. 
 117.  2 T. HAAS, U.S. INDIAN SERVICE, TRIBAL RELATIONS PAMPHLET NO. 3, THE INDIAN & 
THE LAW 16 (1949), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/cohen/Indian%20&%20Law%202 /indian 
_law2.html. 
 118.  See General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 339, 341–342, 348–349, 354, 381 (2012)) (providing for original 25-year 
trust period); Burke Act of 1906, ch. 2348, 34 Stat. 182 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012)) 
(authorizing early issuance of a fee (unrestricted) patent to any Indian allottee upon competency 
determination).  Of course, if a given parcel had the trust status removed, then this was fee land that 
could be sold or otherwise transferred—including to unscrupulous land speculators or through state 
tax foreclosure sales.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 119.  Instead of applying traditional tribal inheritance systems, after allotment, all individual 
allotments necessarily passed by the intestacy laws of the state that surrounded them, often to 
multiple children and relatives.  General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887 § 5; see also 1982 COHEN 
HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 230–31, § B(4)(a), at 618–19. 
 120.  See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 544 (1980) (holding allotment’s “trust 
language” was intended to prevent improvident alienation while assuring “immunity from state 
taxation”). 
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B. Unintended Consequences 
Despite allotment’s Jeffersonian intentions, the transition from 
indigenous use-based property systems to federal trust allotments had the 
perverse effect on the ground of reducing individuals’ actual use and 
occupancy of their own lands.  In its implementation, “allotment was 
followed by a dramatic decline in Indian farming.”121  “[T]he data . . . are 
remarkably uniform in suggesting that in the years from 1900 to 1930 a 
clear and widespread pattern of stagnation and decline was evident 
among the newly allotted Indian farmers.”122  Part of this experience can 
be explained by the failure of allotment’s administrators to provide 
sufficient farming supplies and training for the particular types of 
farming desired, the fact that many allottees received allotments that 
were too small or too dry for successful farming enterprises, and by the 
repercussions of the cultural shock that allottees experienced after they 
were unceremoniously swept into wholesale farming (and isolated living) 
endeavors.123 
However, these social, psychological, and physical challenges are 
not the only causes for the decline in Indian use of Indian land that 
allotment precipitated.  Other significant legal changes also occurred in 
the period immediately after allotment that indirectly began to erode 
allottees’ rights to make use of reservation land.  First, Congress 
introduced a program to facilitate the leasing of Indian allotments to non-
Indians—a program that grew exponentially over time, to the point that 
today the vast majority of Indian lands that are in use at all are used 
through a lease arrangement, often to non-Indian lessees.  Second, the 
allotment policy also caused a massive transfer of title to roughly 65 
percent of reservation lands from Indians to non-Indians, which further 
reduced the available land base that new generations of Indian heirs 
could spread out on and use (and practically compelled more shared 
ownership arrangements on the land that remained).  Finally, the 
Department of Interior’s initial probate program favored sale of 
allotments after an allottee’s death and prohibited wills or tribal 
                                                          
 121.  CARLSON, supra note 1, at 155. 
 122.  Id. at 155. 
 123.  For example, in 1889, one critic reported the story of “one Indian, with several hundred 
acres which composed the grants to himself and family, found ‘that he had indeed a vast but 
unusable possession; a large land estate, but without teams, implements, money, houses or 
experience, and consequently without power to use a foot of it.’”  Otis, supra note 79, at 467 
(quoting 1889 BD. OF INDIAN COMM’RS ANN. REP. 21, at 105). 
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inheritance traditions that would have more flexibly consolidated 
ownership among families. 
1. Introducing the Leasing Program 
The move to BIA-administered leasing of Indian land is perhaps the 
most fateful step away from Indian use of Indian land.  Congress 
changed the trust restrictions on allotments very early on to permit 
leasing of allotments while they were still in the trust status.  These 
changes were controversial even at the time because they were directly 
contrary to the original allotment purpose of converting Indians into 
land-holding, active, and enterprising farmers themselves.124   Leasing 
converted Indian landowners into passive landlords, not agrarian 
farmers. 125   Nonetheless, advocates at the time pushed leasing and 
emphasized the importance of making the most productive use of land 
possible, and it was justified by the idea that incorporating some white 
farmer lessees into the reservation would provide models of Western 
farming techniques and other civilized behaviors that would help teach 
the Indian residents self-reliance. 126   It also, simply, satisfied white 
settlers’ appetite for more land.127 
The move to leasing began in 1891 when Congress gave the 
Department of Interior authority to lease the land of allottees who were 
unable to farm themselves.  The leases were limited in type and duration 
(three years for farming or grazing leases and ten years for mining 
leases), and the authority extended only to allottees who could not 
“personally and with benefit to himself occupy or improve” the land “by 
reason of age or other disability.”128  Over time, the scope of permitted 
                                                          
 124.  E.g., MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 46 (“Indian Office officials . . . remained torn 
[because leasing] could also harm the Natives by enabling them to live off rentals rather than 
farm.”).  For an additional resource summarizing historical-allotment-related legislation during this 
period, see Historical Allotment Legislation, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., 
www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history/historical-allotment-information (last visited Nov. 20, 
2014). 
 125.  MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 44, 60–70 (describing argument that leasing defeated the 
purpose of allotment by taking away the allottees’ incentives to work and noting concerns about 
potential fraud and abuse). 
 126.  Id. at 41. 
 127.  See also LEWIS MERIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 476 (Inst. for Gov’t 
Research ed., 1928) [hereinafter MERIAM REPORT] (“Obviously it is far simpler administratively to 
lease a good piece of land to a white tenant and to dole the proceeds out to the Indian owner than it is 
to educate the Indian to work his own land.”). 
 128.  Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, § 3, 26 Stat. 794, 795 (amending Dawes Act). 
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leases dramatically expanded,129 and the Department of Interior shifted 
approval authority from the Secretary to local Indian agents.130  These 
changes had a dramatic effect.  Before 1894, the Indian Office approved 
only 6 or 8 total leases on Indian allotments.131  In 1925, over 40,000 
leases for grazing and farming were approved on 4 million acres.132 
2. Land Loss 
The second major post-allotment development contributing to 
reduced Indian use of Indian land was significant Indian land loss as a 
result of allotment-era policies.  In addition to a desire to assimilate 
individual Indians into prototypical Christian farmers who would 
cultivate their own private lands, allotment was also motivated by a 
desire to open more land for white farmers’ development. 133   Thus, 
allotment redistributed significant tracts of Indian land to non-Indians.  
This occurred primarily in two ways: (1) so-called surplus land sales, and 
(2) the alienation of individual allotments once fee patents were granted 
and the initial trust protections removed.  As detailed in the following 
section, early practices related to the descent or devise of allotments after 
the allottee’s death also contributed to this problem. 
Most notably, significant swaths of un-allotted Indian lands—the 
euphemistically entitled “surplus lands”—were often opened by the 
federal government to white homesteaders and settlers within reservation 
boundaries.134  In total, Indians lost approximately 60 million acres of 
formerly reserved territories through these surplus land sales, 
significantly reducing the available remaining land on which future 
generations could spread out.135  As Vine Deloria eloquently described: 
The lands were not, of course, surplus. The formula used [for Indian 
allotments]—160 acres for the head of the family, eighty acres for older 
children and wives, and forty acres for minor children, did not look 
even five years down the road to the future of the tribe. If an adult man 
were capable of supporting his family on 160 acres, did that mean that 
                                                          
 129.  E.g., Act of May 31, 1900, ch. 598, 31 Stat. 170 (expanding eligible leasing); Act of June 
25, 1910, ch. 431, § 4, 36 Stat. 856 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 403 (2012)) (permitting 
lease for any purpose if Secretary oversaw expenditure of rent income). 
 130.  See 1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 7; MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 49. 
 131.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 7; MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 43. 
 132.  MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 9–50. 
 133.  Otis, supra note 79, at 434–35 (“It is probably true that the most powerful force motivating 
the allotment policy was the pressure of the land-hungry western settlers.”). 
 134.  CARLSON, supra note 1, at 79; see also Royster, supra note 6, at 13–14. 
 135.  MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 121. 
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his eighteen-year-old son could do so on eighty acres, and a decade 
later his twelve-year-old, now twenty two, on forty acres?136 
In addition, when an individual allottee was deemed “competent,” 
the trust restrictions on land were removed and he received a straight fee 
title to the property, this almost always resulted in the ultimate sale of 
that land to a non-Indian purchaser.137  As one government report from 
1935 concluded, “[t]he granting of fee patents has been practically 
synonymous with outright alienation.”138  In total, an additional 23 to 27 
million acres of originally allotted Indian land passed out of Indian 
ownership from these fee patent transactions.139  Then, these landless ex-
allottees had no other mechanism for acquiring Indian lands because of 
the trust status on remaining allotments and the previous sale of 
“surplus” reservation lands to non-Indians, and therefore in “Indian 
fashion, the landless and homeless ex-allottees domiciled themselves 
upon their relatives, thus overpopulating the remaining Indian lands and 
pressing upon the subsistence which could be wrung from them.”140  
“[W]hile the white newcomers steadily consolidated their holdings into 
good, usable farming and grazing units through their purchases from the 
allottees, supplemented by leasing, exactly the opposite effect was being 
worked upon the lands remaining in Indian ownership.”141 
Putting the surplus land sales and fee patent issues together, a loss of 
approximately 90 million acres of Indian land (out of 138 million acres 
of remaining Indian lands at that time) is attributed to the allotment 
policy.142 
                                                          
 136.  Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of Indian Tribes, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 978 (1996); see also MERIAM REPORT, supra note 127, at 472. 
 137.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 6 (“Indians who retained their land after coming 
into full control over it were rare exceptions.”). 
 138.  Id.  When the Indian Office took a sample of fee patent results on a group of studied 
reservations, only 3 to 20 percent of fee-patented land remained in Indian ownership.  Id. 
 139.  Id.; see also MCDONNELL, supra note 104, at 88–99 (describing how approximately 27 
million acres of lands were lost through “competency determinations” after which newly acquired 
fee titles were sold or transferred to land speculators who either effectuated the competency 
determinations in the first place or pounced soon thereafter to acquire land from unsuspecting (and 
unprotected) allottees). 
 140.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 8. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Guzman, supra note 96, at 605 (explaining that remaining Native American lands plunged 
from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in 1934, for a total loss of 90 million acres in this 
time period). 
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3. Mandatory Intestacy and More Land Loss 
Allottees initially had no right to control the disposition of their 
allotments upon death; Congress did not recognize allottees’ rights to 
devise allotments until 1910.143  Instead of applying traditional tribal 
inheritance systems to those allotments, which may have been more fluid 
and able to adapt to the new changing circumstances, all individual 
allotments passed through the intestacy laws of the state that surrounded 
them, often to multiple children and relatives without regard to tribal 
customs or practices.144 
The Department of Interior also, as a matter of agency practice, 
sought to liquidate many allotments of deceased allottees through 
government-supervised sales (with proceeds going to the heirs), or, 
instead, to pass the allotments to the allottees’ heirs in an unprotected fee 
status without the alienation restrictions of the original trust status (with 
such fee patents to Indian heirs presumably resulting in alienation to non-
Indians at the same high rates as fee patents issued to the original 
allottees through competency determinations, as described above). 145  
Initially, many of these heirs would have received their own separate 
allotments already, but this changed over time.146  The initial emphasis 
on liquidation or fee distributions, however, did not change as quickly.147 
                                                          
 143.  Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 2, 36 Stat. 855 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 373 
(2012)).  This legislation recognized the right of individual Indian allottees who were at least 21 
years old to write wills to dispose of allotments that were still held in trust (i.e., before the issuance 
of the fee patents).  To be valid, however, the will had to be “approved by the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior.”  Id.  At the same time, Congress also permitted an 
Indian allottee effectively to gift deed (or otherwise “relinquish”) the allotment to his or her children 
who had not themselves received any allotment of land during his or her life.  Id. 
  In 1913, Congress gave this same right to dispose of trust allotments by will to “any persons 
of the age of twenty-one years having any right, title, or interest in any allotment held under trust”—
and not just to the original Indian allottee herself.  Act of February 14, 1913, ch. 55, § 2, 37 Stat. 
678. 
 144.  General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 339, 341–342, 348–349, 354, 381 (2012)); see also 1982 COHEN HANDBOOK, 
supra note 99, at 230–31, 618–19. 
 145.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 15–16 (describing government supervised sale of 
allotment with proceeds distributed to heirs and transfer of allotments to heirs in fee patents as 
typical actions of the Indian agencies upon an allottee’s death); see also MERIAM REPORT, supra 
note 127, at 471. 
 146.  E.g., Deloria, supra note 136, at 978. 
 147.  See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, amended by Act of May 8, 1906, ch. 
2348, 34 Stat. 182; Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444; Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, 36 
Stat. 855; Act of Feb. 14, 1913, ch. 55, 37 Stat. 678. 
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As time passed, some reforms made the continuation of trust status 
for heirs plausible.148  In 1935, the Office of Interior Affairs reported to 
Congress that after an allottee died its options and common practices 
were to (1) sell the allotment, (2) issue a fee patent to the heirs as co-
owners, (3) physically partition the allotment with heirs receiving 
individual patents to a portion of the former allotment in either fee or 
trust, depending on the competency of the individual heir (thus avoiding 
any co-ownership issues), or (4) maintain the trust status of the allotment 
but have the superintendent lease the land “for the benefit of the heirs” 
(apparently instead of the heirs themselves making any direct use of 
it).149 
Notably, these practices favored fee patents and outright sales.  
There was no support or even a clear mechanism for new co-owners to 
consolidate interests fairly and efficiently or to support shared ownership 
arrangements among heirs or devisees within the preserved trust status.150  
Thus, while the practice of white farmers at the time had been to devise 
their farms and improvements to a single heir, who then took out a loan 
secured by a mortgage to pay the other heirs in cash, this was not 
possible in the context of Indian lands—first because of the initial 
prohibition on wills and then because of the alienation (and therefore 
mortgaging) restrictions.151  Instead, the rules governing the distributions 
of allotments upon the death of the allottee that were in place 
immediately after allotment further separated Indian landowners from the 
use of their own land. 
4. Fractionation and a Permanent Trust Status 
Thus, even as allotment intended to promote private landownership 
and Indian landowners’ cultivation of their own lands, the experience on 
the ground was exactly the opposite.  By the 1920s, leasing of Indian 
land to non-Indians had dramatically expanded, and more than 65 
percent of the Indian land base had been sold to non-Indians. 152  
Allotment had decreased the flexibility of Indian owners to use their own 
                                                          
 148.  E.g., Act of May 18, 1916, ch. 125, §1, 39 Stat. 127 (authorizing a partition in kind upon an 
allottee’s death with fee patents issued to competent heirs and trust patents to the incompetent heirs). 
 149.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 15–16. 
 150.  In 1934, Congress found that allottees’ heirs were making appreciable use of Indian land on 
only two of sixteen studied reservations.  Id. at 20. 
 151.  Id. at 2. 
 152.  DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 219–21 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d ed. 
1990) (summarizing MERIAM REPORT, supra note 127). 
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land and increased bureaucratic burdens.  A 1928 Congressional study of 
Indian farming found that, after allotment, “the number of real farmers is 
comparatively small” and the majority of Indians “are considerably 
below any satisfactory standard for subsistence farming.”153  This report 
blamed federal policy “allowing or even encouraging Indians to lease or 
sell their lands and live off the proceeds.”154  A year earlier, a similar 
federal study—this time of irrigated farming on Indian reservations—
found that “32 percent of the irrigated lands on Indian reservations . . . 
was farmed by Indians, with 68 percent . . . farmed by white owners (37 
percent) or white lessors (31 percent).”155  Moreover, this report warned 
“the acreage utilized by Indians is continuously decreasing, while the 
acreage utilized by whites is increasing.”156 
As skepticism about allotment’s actual effects grew, Congress passed 
the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934 in part to reverse the 
growing pattern of non-Indian use and ownership of Indian lands and to 
encourage “home rule” by Indians.157  By 1938, the official handbook of 
federal Indian policy prepared by the Office of Indian Affairs provided 
that “Indian land policy definitely looks toward the substitution of Indian 
use for non-Indian use of Indian lands.”158  As the Department of Interior 
explained in 1945, “[t]he primary object of Indian land policy is to save 
and to provide for the Indian people adequate land, in such a tenure and 
in accordance with such proper usage that they may subsist on it 
permanently by their own labor.”159 
The IRA formally put an end to the allotment policy and prohibited 
further subdivision of reservation lands to individual Indians in 
severalty. 160   The IRA also extended the trust status of remaining 
allotments and its accompanying restrictions on alienation and 
                                                          
 153.  CARLSON, supra note 1, at 134. 
 154.  Id. at 135. 
 155.  Id. (citing Review of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings Before the 
Commission on Indian Affairs, 71st Cong. 308, 2210–2661 (1930)). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See generally Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. §§ 461–494 (2012)). 
 158.  1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 235 n.176 (quoting OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAND POLICY AND MANUAL OF PROCEDURES, at 1–
3 (1938); see also MERIAM REPORT, supra note 127, at 469 (“The primary duty [of the Indian 
Service] is to educate the Indians in the use and management of their own property.”). 
 159.  1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 235 n.176 (quoting OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK OF INDIAN LAND POLICY AND MANUAL OF PROCEDURES, at 1–
3 (1938)). 
 160.  Wheeler-Howard Act § 1. 
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bureaucratic oversight indefinitely (a status that remains today).161  As 
with its stated purpose during allotment, this now-permanent trust status 
was intended to preserve title in Indian hands while Indians made use of 
their own land as owners.162  The IRA also directed the Department of 
Interior to promulgate “such other rules and regulations as may be 
necessary . . . to assure full utilization of the range, and like purposes.”163 
Although intended as a fix, the IRA exchanged one set of land tenure 
problems (allotment and land loss) for another (permanent restrictive 
trust title and expanding federal bureaucracy).  Very quickly, as 
liquidation of allotments or forced-issuing of fee patents no longer 
occurred, the fractionation problem expanded.164  By the 1930s, 6.25 
million acres, or 35 percent of remaining allotments, were co-owned in 
trust by multiple heirs,165 and critics of the IRA’s permanent trust status 
described further fractionation of these titles among increasing numbers 
of co-owners as “a definite certainty” given the permanent transfer 
restrictions and bureaucracy imposed by the IRA.166  By the 1960s, half 
of allotments were in heirship status.167  This would prove important 
because, although the IRA was intended to reaffirm the importance of 
Indian use of Indian lands, the increasingly fractionated condition of the 
Indian land base would ultimately be used to justify further limits on 
those co-owner’s retained property rights. 
                                                          
 161.  Wheeler-Howard Act § 2; see also 1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 4. 
 162.  See supra notes 116–20, 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 163.  Wheeler-Howard Act § 6. 
 164.  H. COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 86TH CONG., INDIAN HEIRSHIP LAND 
STUDY: ANALYSIS OF INDIAN OPINION AS EXPRESSED IN QUESTIONNAIRES, xiii (Comm. Print 27) 
(Dec. 31, 1960) [hereinafter HEIRSHIP STUDY] (describing fractionation as “one of the most serious 
problems facing our American Indian population”); 1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 3; 
1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 234–35 (concluding “[t]hese heirship tracts are potentially one 
of the most important of the Indian resources” and describing “what to do with these lands . . . [as] 
of paramount importance”). 
 165.  1935 LAND PLANNING, supra note 110, at 5, 15. 
 166.  1941 HANDBOOK, supra note 116, at 234. 
 167.  William H. Gilbert & John L. Taylor, Indian Land Questions, 8 ARIZ. L. REV. 102, 107–08, 
110 (1966) (analyzing Congressional reports on Indian land issues from 1952 to 1965); see also 
Ethel Williams, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs—The Indian Heirship Land Problem, 46 WASH. L. 
REV. 709, 713 (1971) (noting that more than a dozen bills had been introduced in Congress between 
the Meriam Report and 1971 but none had been enacted and analyzing some related Congressional 
reports); Wesley L. Nutten, III, Probate Problems of the American Indian, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 495, 500 (1972) (describing how “continual fractionation of allotted lands presents a serious 
problem which has hampered realistic and economic use of Indian lands”). 
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C. The Persistence of Some Owner’s Use 
After the IRA halted allotment, new rounds of Congressional 
legislation reflected continued support for Indian users and possessors of 
Indian lands, even while simultaneously making it easier to lease those 
lands to third parties.  The logic was to prioritize and carve out 
protections for an owner’s use and possession of her own land, where it 
was occurring, but to facilitate third-party leasing where it was not. 
1. Preemptive Power 
While the IRA ultimately exacerbated fractionation as a practical 
matter, it made no direct legal changes to the retained possession rights 
of individual co-owners.  Because the original allottee had full 
possession rights, presumably his heirs, and their heirs after that, 
inherited those same rights, albeit in a shared ownership form. 168  
Congress did not explicitly define the co-ownership rules to govern the 
relationships among these heirs as co-owners, and at least in theory this 
should have been the province of the governing tribe.  However, perhaps 
the federal government’s most direct post-IRA statement on the issue 
came in a leasing act passed in 1940.  This 1940 statute, which remains 
in effect today, defines the conditions under which reservation 
superintendents (agency-level BIA employees) may execute surface 
leases of allotments on behalf of an allotment’s owners—that is, when 
the Secretary can grant leases of Indian lands without the owners’ 
consent, as opposed to when the Secretary can approve leases otherwise 
agreed to by the co-owners themselves. 169   The statute applies to 
allotments only after the original allottee has died, and it provides that a 
reservation superintendent can grant a lease of an allotment without the 
co-owners’ consent: (1) while the allotment is still in the process of being 
probated, or (2) when the new generations of co-owners cannot reach 
their own lease agreement in a three-month period—as long as the “lands 
                                                          
 168.  See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Act of July 8, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-732, 54 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 
380 (2012)).  While the 1940 Act authorized the superintendents to execute leases on the 
landowners’ behalf (i.e., without landowner consent), other preceding and subsequent legislation 
clarified that landowners could still themselves agree to a lease of their own land, if the BIA 
approved it.  E.g., Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 (1955) (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 415, 415(a) (2012)); see also Goodluck-Jones v. Navajo Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 56 I.B.I.A. 257 (2013) (discussing modern difference between BIA approval and BIA 
granting authorities in leasing); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal 
Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (2004). 
416 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
are not in use by any of the heirs” at that time.170  This legislation is 
codified at 25 U.S.C. § 380, and it will hereinafter be referred to as the 
“1940 Act.” 
On the one hand, this 1940 Act greatly facilitated the leasing of 
allotted Indian land to non-owners (predominately non-Indians) by 
expanding the superintendents’ authority to lease allotments on behalf of 
Indian owners, even without the owners’ consent.  Indeed, this was the 
primary purpose for which Acting Secretary of Interior E.K. Burlew first 
requested Congress to pass this legislation.171  In his communication to 
the Speaker of the House submitting his request for this legislation, 
Secretary Burlew noted that leasing is the “only method in many cases of 
deriving some benefit from the land” as it was “often not possible for all 
of the heirs or devisees, or even a majority of them, to agree upon the use 
to be made of the land.”172  He explained that as the numbers of co-
owners increased, heirs or devisees were frequently unable to agree 
about who should lease the land or at what price.  In some cases, 
individuals’ interests were so small that the owners would simply refuse 
to agree to a lease “because of the small intrinsic value of their interest in 
the land.”173  Thus, Secretary Burlew sought a more simplified leasing 
program that would allow superintendents to execute leases “whenever 
such lands are not in use by any of such Indians and they have not been 
able during a 3-month period to agree upon a lease” in order to “protect[] 
the land and its value, [e]nsure an income to the interested Indians and 
reduce the cost to the Government in administering such lands.”174 
At this point in history, as Secretary Burlew’s comments may imply, 
the Department of Interior seemed to require as a matter of practice 
unanimous co-owner consent before an owner-negotiated lease to a third 
party could be considered for BIA approval.175  This high standard of 
                                                          
 170.  Act of July 8, 1940, 54 Stat. 745. 
 171.  See S. REP. NO. 76-1570 (1940); H.R. REP. NO. 76-1615 (1940). 
 172.  Id. (reprinting communication dated January 16, 1940). 
 173.  S. REP. NO. 76-1570. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See, e.g., HEIRSHIP STUDY, supra note 164, at 3.  The source of this 100-percent approval 
interpretation is not entirely clear, but more recently, the Senate Indian Affairs Committee reported 
that the Department of Interior’s historic understanding that unanimous co-owner consent was 
required before there could be “a lease, agreement, or the sale of natural resources associated with 
allotted lands” may have been an “implication” from nineteenth and early twentieth century statutes 
that “refer to the lease or use of these lands upon the approval of ‘the owner,’” which at least raised 
“the question of whether this requires the approval of each undivided interest holder, even when 
these individuals number in the thousands.”  S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 22–23 (2000).  Likewise, then-
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover testified in 1999 that the Department of Interior 
interpreted the mineral leasing statute at 25 U.S.C. § 396 to “require[] that the consent of all the 
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perfect co-owner unanimity to a lease is inapposite to the renting options 
available in non-Indian jurisdictions where any individual co-owner may 
typically lease her undivided interest as long as she shares the resulting 
rental income with her other co-owners proportionately.  Further, other 
remedies such as ouster and partition exist in those jurisdictions to 
resolve conflicts among lessees and other active co-owners, without the 
need to make unanimous consent a prerequisite to every third party 
lease.176 
Requiring complete co-owner agreement before any Indian lease 
could be approved would have made leasing to third parties more 
difficult, as Secretary Burlew complained; however, it may also have had 
indirect advantages for co-owners’ own possession rights in the Indian 
context.  With a 100 percent approval rule for owner-negotiated leases, a 
single Indian co-owner in actual possession of the property would have 
essentially been able to veto any owner-negotiated lease to a different 
party, simply by refusing to consent to the lease pursued by the other co-
owners themselves (and thus precluding them from reaching the 
necessary unanimity of consent to the proposed lease). 
The 1940 Act did not address or change the Department of Interior’s 
interpretation of this 100 percent rule itself; instead, it provided new 
authority for the Department to grant its own lease of the land (without 
any co-owner consent at all) if the owners could not all agree to a lease 
on their own and as long as one of the co-owners was not using the land 
already. 177   In this way, both the 1940 Act and Secretary Burlew’s 
                                                          
 
owners of a tract of trust . . . land be obtained prior to the approval of a mineral lease by the 
Secretary of the Interior” and argued that, due to fractionation, this 100 percent consent requirement 
precluded full Indian participation in mineral exploration and development.  Indian Land 
Consolidation Act Amendments; and to Permit the Leasing of Oil and Gas on Navajo Allotted 
Lands: Joint Hearing on S. 1586 and S. 1315, H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs and 
the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 47–54 (1999) (statement of Kevin Gover, Assistant Sec’y 
for Indian Affairs).  The statute cited by the then-Assistant Secretary Gover, however, says only that 
“[a]ll lands allotted to Indians in severalty . . . may by said allottee by leased for mining purposes” if 
the Secretary deems it advisable.  Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 783 (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2012)).  Nothing in the statute itself expressly requires unanimous co-owner 
consent where the original “allottee” has died or otherwise transferred ownership.  Nonetheless, until 
subsequent legislative changes to the leasing consent requirements, this seems to have been the 
Department of Interior’s fairly consistent position.  Cf. infra note 196 (discussing modern 50 percent 
rule for agricultural leases) and notes 232–34 (discussing modern sliding scale consent rules for 
other leases) and accompanying text. 
 176.  See supra Part II. 
 177.  Although the 1940 Act speaks only of “heirs” in direct use of the allotment as precluding a 
third-party lease, the Department has consistently interpreted this as protecting both “heirs and 
devisees” who own an interest in the allotment.  For example, when the first significant Indian 
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comments implicitly recognized and protected some pre-existing rights 
of Indian co-owners to use and possess their jointly owned land.  Under 
the 1940 Act, the Secretary could avoid the consent challenges of the 100 
percent rule, but only if such “lands are not in use by any of the heirs” 
themselves.178 
In combination, the 1940 Act’s prohibition on the Department of 
Interior’s leasing where a co-owner was already using the land, and the 
100 percent approval rule for owner-negotiated leases, gave strong 
protections to a co-owner’s use rights.  A single co-owner in actual 
possession of the property could have prevented any third-party 
leasing—either by holding out from the other owners’ attempts to get 
100 percent agreement on an owner-negotiated lease or by directly 
preempting the authority of the BIA to execute a lease to another lessee 
on the owners’ behalf under the 1940 Act.  Beyond this basic framework, 
however, neither the 1940 Act nor any identified Department of Interior 
regulations defined precisely the parameters of these pre-existing rights 
of co-owners.  Instead, the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) did 
much of the work of setting out the scope of this protected owner’s use 
right through the end of the twentieth century.179 
2. Agency Interpretations 
One of the most important threshold issues left open to interpretation 
was what constituted “in use” for purposes of the 1940 Act’s carve out of 
the BIA’s authority to lease the land.  What exactly was the scope of the 
co-owner’s use rights implied by this preemption?  Nothing in the 1940 
Act’s language conditioned the heir’s qualifying “use” on any prior co-
owner or BIA permission in any way, and no such consent would be 
required in a traditional tenancy in common framework.  However, at 
least some historical references suggest there may have been some 
                                                          
 
leasing regulations were published in the Code of Federal Regulations in 1961, the Department of 
Interior’s regulations affirmed that the Secretary could grant leases of allotments on behalf of 
allotment co-owners who had not been able to agree to their own lease in a three-month prior period 
but only “provided, that the land is not in use by any of the heirs or devisees.”  25 C.F.R. § 131.2 
(1961) (recodifed at 25 C.F.R. § 162.2(a)(4) (1982)) (emphasis added) (“Grants of leases by 
Secretary”). 
 178.  Act of July 8, 1940, 54 Stat. 745. 
 179.  The IBIA hears various administrative appeals on behalf of the Secretary of Interior, 
including leasing and land-related appeals from decisions by the BIA.  See generally The Board’s 
Jurisdiction in General, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/oha/ibia/the-board-
jurisdiction-in-general.cfm (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
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confusion or uncertainty about whether, essentially, the Department of 
Interior should expand, in practice, the “100 percent consent” concept to 
an owner’s own possession as well—assuming that a co-owner too 
needed unanimous permission from his co-owners before putting her 
own land to her own use.180 
Although not always consistent, the IBIA did correctly confirm in at 
least some cases that a co-owner of Indian land had the right to put her 
own land “in use” informally, directly, and without any prior permission 
from other co-owners or the BIA.  This kind of informally initiated 
owner’s use precluded the BIA or the other owners from leasing the land 
out to someone else. 181   This understanding of the informality and 
directness of the Indian owner’s use rights is also consistent with the 
language and logic of the 1940 Act.  If the owner’s use rights referred to 
in the 1940 Act had to be pursuant to a formal lease or other agreement 
from the other co-owners in order to be valid, this language preempting 
BIA leasing in the 1940 Act would be superfluous.  It would mean that 
the agency could not grant a new lease for an allotment when a co-owner 
of the allotment was already leasing the land from her co-owners, but of 
                                                          
 180.  E.g., HEIRSHIP STUDY, supra note 164, at 7 (noting that although many Indian heirs 
reported intention to use heirship land in the future “[a] question arises here as to whether these heirs 
[who] intended to use heirship land in the future are aware that permission is needed from the other 
heirs and that this (according to the heir’s [sic] statements in the returns) is very difficult to obtain”).  
On this theme, it is also important to stress that historically there has often been significant variance 
among the Department of Interior and BIA offices, especially at the reservation agency level, as to 
how specific real estate issues were addressed (especially in the absence of clear regulatory and 
statutory guidance).  E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-00-259, INDIAN 
TRUST FUNDS: IMPROVEMENTS MADE IN ACQUISITION OF NEW ASSET AND ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
BUT SIGNIFICANT RISKS REMAIN 18 (2006).  This local variance likely also existed in some 
instances about the scope of owner’s use rights until recently.  E.g., Blackhawk v. Billings Area Dir., 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 24 I.B.I.A. 275, 281 & n.7 (1993) (discussing example of same); infra 
notes 288-91 and accompanying text. 
 181.  Lower Peoples Creek Coop. v. Acting Billings Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 23 
I.B.I.A. 297, 301, 303–04 (1993) (holding that agency superintendent did not have authority to lease 
out a portion of a jointly owned allotment that was already being informally used as a homesite by a 
co-owner even where that co-owner’s ongoing use was possibly without the consent of the other co-
owners; also noting that informal co-owner use arrangements like this, without any kind of formal 
lease, were common at this time); see also Blackhawk, 24 I.B.I.A. at 281–82 & n.7 (explaining that 
the owners’ use rights protected in the 1940 Act “apply only in a case where the land is already in 
use by one of the landowners,” including in at least some cases landowners who initiate use “without 
entering into any agreement with his co-owners”; also holding that special tribal or agency-level 
owners’ use policies must reflect at least some respect for these threshold owners’ use rights); 
Whiteman v. Billings Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 25 I.B.I.A. 292, 293, 295 (1994) (quoting 
BIA statement that co-owner has right to “make use of his own land” as long as “the property is 
currently in use by the person claiming owner’s use” and holding that it was only because co-owner 
had not supported his allegation of pre-existing use of the allotment that the BIA could advertise a 
lease to another party instead). 
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course, even without the 1940 Act, the BIA could never grant a new 
lease when a current lease was already effect.182 
In 1996, the Department of Interior in regulatory comments also 
acknowledged that the 1940 Act “allowed the ‘heirs and devisees’ of 
allottees to prevent us from exercising our broad grant authority on 
heirship land, by putting the land to direct use.”183  In this way, at least 
some co-owners of Indian lands did enjoy the preemptive right to put 
“the land to direct use” similar to the rights of non-Indian co-tenants, and 
this Indian owner’s use right also worked affirmatively to preclude the 
Department from leasing the land to another party.184 
Although acknowledging the continued validity of these owner’s use 
rights in general, the IBIA did institute some other limits on such 
claims. 185   For example, the IBIA came to require that the owner 
claiming an owner’s use right had to prove historic, continuous, and 
current use of the property in order to assert protection from a current 
request to lease the land to another, and an owner could only claim this 
preemptive owner’s use right over the portion of the allotment that she 
was actively putting “in use,” not necessarily or automatically the entire 
legal tract.186  The IBIA also prohibited an owner from sub-leasing or 
assigning her owner’s use rights to a non-owner.187 
In addition, the IBIA limited the owner’s use protections under the 
1940 Act to “heirs or devisees” and did not extend protections to other 
co-owners who acquired interests in the allotment by purchase or other 
                                                          
 182.  See also Blackhawk, 24 I.B.I.A. at 281–82 (requiring that any special or more onerous 
tribal owner’s use policies be read in conjunction with this protection of owner’s use rights in the 
1940 Act).  
 183.  Leasing and Permitting, 61 Fed. Reg. 30560-01, 30562–63 (proposed June 17, 1996) 
(revising 25 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
 184.  Id. at 30563; see also Bobroff, supra note 77, at 1617 (explaining that “there is little doubt 
that co-owners then [in 1892], as they do today [in 2001], reached accommodations allowing some 
uses of the land”). 
 185.  Blackhawk, 24 I.B.I.A. at 280–81 (recognizing some owner’s use practices); Danks v. 
Aberdeen Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 20 I.B.I.A. 79, 80 (1991) (noting that owner of 13/63 
interest in allotment “evidently farm[s] all or part . . . under some kind of ‘owner’s use’ 
arrangement”); Smith v. Acting Anadarko Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 34 I.B.I.A. 283, 286 
& n.5 (2000) (lamenting “lack of regulatory guidance” and some continuing uncertainty about 
“situations where an allotment is in fractionated ownership and one co-owner invokes ‘owner’s use’ 
of all or part of the allotment”). 
 186.  Whiteman, 25 I.B.I.A. at 295 (requiring proof of actual owner’s use); Evans v. Sacramento 
Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 28 I.B.I.A. 124 (1995) (no analysis of owner’s use rights where 
co-owner’s prior house on allotment had burned down several years ago and thus she had apparently 
not maintained any kind of continuous use); Emm v. Phx. Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs (Emm 
II), 34 I.B.I.A. 260, 263–64 (2000) (limiting use claim to area actually used); Lower Peoples Creek 
Coop., 23 I.B.I.A. at 303–04 (same). 
 187.  Smith, 34 I.B.I.A. at 286–87. 
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means.188  The IBIA noted that excluding purchasers in this way would 
“prevent[], for example, an individual from purchasing a small interest in 
heirship land and filing for Owner’s Use on the entire tract.”189  This 
also, of course, would have further reduced any market value of these 
small interests as, apparently, a purchaser could not buy all the same 
direct use and possession rights that her co-owners could inherit. 
3. Modeling Indian Farmers, Again 
Meanwhile, in 1993, Congress again became concerned with a 
decline in federal support for Indians’ agricultural endeavors on Indian 
lands and the fact that significant acres of Indian agricultural land were 
idle.190  In response, Congress passed the American Indian Agricultural 
Resource Management Act (AIARMA),191 which applies to “agricultural 
land” in Indian Country.192  AIARMA is essentially a federal land use 
statute for Indian agricultural lands.  Two of AIARMA’s stated 
purposes are to affirm the role of tribal governments in the 
management and regulation of Indian agricultural lands and “to 
enhance the capability of Indian ranchers and farmers to produce crops 
and products from such lands.”193  In particular, AIARMA requires 
that Indian agricultural lands be managed “[t]o enable Indian farmers 
and ranchers to maximize the potential benefits available to them 
through their land.”194  Further, to the extent AIARMA authorizes the 
Secretary to assist in Indian land management, the Secretary’s 
involvement is to be “with the participation of the beneficial owners of 
the land, in a manner consistent with . . . the objectives of the beneficial 
owners.”195 
                                                          
 188.  Fenner v. Acting Billings Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 29 I.B.I.A. 116, 119–20 
(1996). 
 189.  Id. at 119 n.7; see also Blackhawk, 24 I.B.I.A. at 279 n.3. 
 190.  See S. REP. NO. 103-186, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2459, 2460 (noting 
“over 1.1 million acres of Indian trust land lay idle nationwide”). 
 191.  Pub. L. No. 103-177, tit. I, § 105, 107 Stat. 2011, 2017–18 (1993); see also Pub. L. No. 
103-435, § 12(a), 108 Stat. 4566, 4572 (1994) (technical amendments). 
 192.  25 U.S.C. § 3703(1) (2012). 
 193.  S. REP. NO. 103-186, at 1 (analyzing H.R. 1425).  AIARMA’s findings and purposes are 
also codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3702.  The congressional findings, in particular, note that “Indian 
agricultural lands . . . are vital to the economic, social, and cultural welfare of many Indian tribes and 
their members” and planned development and management of these lands “will produce increased 
economic returns, enhance Indian self-determination, promote employment opportunities, and 
improve the social and economic well-being of Indian and surrounding communities.”  25 U.S.C. § 
3701(3)–(4). 
 194.  25 U.S.C. § 3711(4). 
 195.  25 U.S.C. § 3702(2). 
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Thus, with AIARMA—as with allotment, the IRA, and arguably the 
1940 Act before it—Congress yet again articulated a policy of promoting 
Indian autonomy on Indian land.  One of the most significant changes of 
AIARMA was to permit only a majority of the individual owners of 
Indian agricultural land to enter into an agricultural lease of that land,196 
instead of the 100 percent consent requirement prior to AIARMA.197  
Thus, theoretically under AIARMA, a smaller group of owners—a bare 
majority of trust interests—could bind non-consenting co-owners to an 
agricultural lease of the land.198  If limited to this plain language alone, 
this majority-consent rule for third-party agricultural leases could have 
been read to permit co-owners to lease without regard to the interests of a 
minority-interest owner who was currently in informally initiated 
possession of the land.  Whereas a single owner in possession had an 
implicit right to veto a lease to a third party under the former 100-percent 
consent rule, the new AIARMA rule may have been interpreted to mean 
that 51 percent of the trust interests in the land could lease 100 percent of 
the land over the objection of even a 49 percent co-owner in current use 
and possession of any portion of the land. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) this apparent conflict, AIARMA also 
provided under related statutory language entitled “Rights of individual 
landowners”: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or altering the 
authority or right of an individual allottee or Indian tribe in the legal or 
beneficial use of his, her, or its own land or to enter into an agricultural 
lease of the surface interest of his, her, or its allotment or land under 
any other provision of law. 199 
At least initially, the IBIA interpreted this language as providing 
significantly expanded protections of owner’s use rights in agricultural 
land, even beyond what was protected by the 1940 Act. 
In 1996, the IBIA heard an important case involving an agricultural 
lease on the Walker Indian Reservation involving an in-tenant named 
Roger Williams.  Williams purchased a one-third interest in the allotment 
and had, 15 years earlier, erected a fence around approximately six acres 
of the lot, roughly equivalent to one-third of the acreage in the 
                                                          
 196.  25 U.S.C. § 3715(c)(2)(A). 
 197.  See, e.g., supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 198.  25 U.S.C. § 3715(c)(2)(A); 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.207(c), 162.209 (2006).  Ultimately, this 
leasing percentage requirement was modified for non-agricultural leases, too.  See infra notes 232-34 
and accompanying text. 
 199.  25 U.S.C. § 3715(c)(1). 
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allotment.200  When the other co-owners of the allotment sought to lease 
the land to someone else, Williams claimed owner’s use rights under 
AIARMA to that portion of the allotment that he had been farming for 15 
years.201  Despite objections by some of the other co-owners, the IBIA 
ultimately concluded that the agency could not lease the portion of the 
allotment that Williams was using to anyone else, even where a majority 
of the other ownership interests in the property would have consented to 
do so.202  Thus, Williams could preclude a majority of co-owners from 
otherwise exercising their rights under AIARMA to lease the land out 
from under him because it interfered with his pre-existing owner’s use 
rights, which the IBIA read AIARMA to protect, regardless of how 
Williams came into ownership of his trust interest.203 
In reaching this decision, the IBIA acknowledged that the term 
“allottee” used in the “rights of individual landowners” section of the 
statute “is a term of art in Indian law,” and could be read to mean only 
“the individual to whom an allotment of land was made” had his pre-
existing owner’s use rights preserved and protected under AIARMA.204  
The Board reasoned, however, that because no allotments had been made 
since 1934 “only a small percentage of trust or restricted land [was] still 
owned by ‘allottees’” in 1996.205  In any event “each ‘allottee’ normally 
owns the full interest in the allotment he or she received” so the 
protections from BIA for co-owner leasing would not be required.206  
Moreover, the IBIA emphasized that the purpose of AIARMA was to 
“enhance the capability of Indian ranchers and farmers to produce crops” 
from Indian lands,207 regardless of how they came to own the land at 
issue.208  Thus, the IBIA reasoned that Congress did not intend for Indian 
                                                          
 200.  Emm v. Phx. Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs (Emm I), 30 I.B.I.A. 72, 72–74 (1996). 
 201.  Id.  Williams alleged that he had been farming this fenced-in portion of the allotment for 15 
years, that one of the other co-owners had helped him set the corner posts for the fence, and that he 
needed the hay produced on “his” portion of the allotment for his cattle.  Id. at 73–74. 
 202.  Id. at 74, 81.  The Board subsequently clarified its decision in 2000 to hold that only the 
portion of the allotment that Williams was using was subject to his owner’s use rights, and the BIA 
only needed to remove that portion of the allotment—not the entire allotment—from the appealed 
lease.  Emm II, 34 I.B.I.A. 260, 263–64 (2000). 
 203.  As described in more detail in the following section, by this time, the IBIA was already 
requiring in-tenants in possession to pay their co-owners for their use of their land, and so Williams 
was required to “compensate the other co-owners.”  Emm I, 30 I.B.I.A. at 81 n.11 (citing Lower 
Peoples Creek Coop. v. Acting Billings Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 23 I.B.I.A. 297 (1993)). 
 204.  Id. at 76. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. at 78 (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-186, at 1 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2459). 
 208.  Id. at 79 (“[T]he Board finds nothing in the legislative history which suggests Congress 
believed Indian landowners should be treated differently based upon the way in which they acquired 
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landowners to be treated differently based on how they acquired their 
interest in trust land and, implicitly, that Congress intended to promote 
Indian use of Indian land with a strong protection for individuals’ pre-
existing property rights to use and possess even their jointly owned 
agricultural land.209 
D. Requiring Rent 
Finally, the IBIA also came to require—without much discussion or 
any reference to a specific statutory mandate—that a co-owner in 
possession of his or her own land pay reasonable rent to her co-owners in 
exchange for her use and possession of their jointly owned land, although 
this was not always consistently applied in practice. 210   In contrast, 
traditional tenancy in common rules do not require an in-tenant to 
compensate her co-owners for exercising her own possession rights in 
this way unless there has been an ouster, and ouster requires an actual 
conflict between two active owners.211 
According to the IBIA, unlike in a traditional tenancy in common, an 
Indian co-owner’s “right to receive compensation for [another co-
owner’s] use of their interests in the allotment” vests regardless of 
                                                          
 
their interest in trust or restricted land.”); see also DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEDURAL 
HANDBOOK: LEASING AND PERMITTING 11 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 LEASING HANDBOOK] (copy on 
file with author) (requiring, after subsequent 2001 rule changes, a lease or unanimous co-owner 
permission for “Indian landowners,” without mention of method of interest acquisition). 
 209.  Emm I, 30 I.B.I.A. at 78–80. 
 210.  Lower Peoples Creek Coop. v. Acting Billings Area, Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 23 
I.B.I.A. 297, 304 & n.10. (1993).  The conflict in Lower Peoples Creek was between a co-owner in 
possession and a “cooperative of landowners” who were seeking a lease of the same property.  Id. at 
298.  The cooperative itself was not a co-owner, but the fact that some of the cooperative’s 
individual members may have been co-owners may have provided a way of reconciling that case 
with the traditional no-rent rule for co-owners in possession (because it looked more like a 
traditional ouster dispute between co-owners here). 
  It is also important to note, however, that because many decisions on co-owner use are 
made at the agency level, it is difficult to pinpoint precisely if the BIA may have begun requiring co-
owner rental payments before this date, at least in some places.  See supra note 180 (also discussing 
real estate practice variances among BIA offices).  The Department of Interior did include this rent 
requirement in its internal Procedural Handbook in 2006.  See 2006 LEASING HANDBOOK, supra note 
208, at 11 (providing that while an Indian landowner using his or her own land “must pay his co-
owners at least fair market rental unless those co-owners have waived their right to receive rental 
income”).  However, as some commentators established in response to the Department of Interior’s 
new leasing regulations expressly requiring rent payments in most cases, this prior IBIA requirement 
was not always applied consistently at every agency and in every case.  See infra notes 288–91 and 
accompanying text. 
 211.  See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
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whether that co-owner has ever tried to use or been denied access to the 
property.212  Instead, according to the IBIA, “[i]t is [the occupying co-
owner’s] personal, long-term occupancy or ‘possession’ of the land—
which he does not dispute—that gives rise to Appellant’s obligation to 
pay rent to his co-owners.”213 
In another opinion, the IBIA also cited with apparent approval a BIA 
letter that suggested that a co-owner in possession not only owed rent for 
her actual use of the land but also had a duty to use the property at its 
highest and best potential use (and rental value): 
A partial owner using this land for grazing or hay-cutting without 
compensation to the owners is not considered protecting the interests of 
the other owners.  Neither would use by a partial owner for some 
purpose which denied the other owners benefit of a higher and better 
return.  An example would be grazing use by partial owner when the 
tract could be leased for farming, industrial or commercial purposes.214 
The requirement of rent for a co-owner’s own use or possession of 
land is theoretically distinct from whether that co-owner even has use or 
possession rights in the first place.  The IBIA’s rent requirement did not 
change the threshold possession right.  However, this implication that a 
co-owner may be required not only to pay fair rental value for his actual 
use but must also ensure the “high[est] and [best] return” possible from 
the property is novel and beyond the requirements of any traditional co-
ownership rule.215  This is so even in jurisdictions where some rent is 
owed, and if applied in the Indian land context, such a heightened rent 
requirement may have created practical limitations to the exercise of 
otherwise informal co-owner possession rights.216 
                                                          
 212.  Cadotte v. Acting Aberdeen Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 31 I.B.I.A. 175, 176 
(1997); see also Thompson v. Acting S. Plains Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 54 I.B.I.A. 125, 
130 (2011). 
 213.  Id.  The rent obligation is offset by the amount he or she owns, however.  In other words, if 
a co-owner owned half of an allotment that was assessed with a rental rate of $100 per month, that 
co-owner could offset that rent by 50 percent or her half ownership interest so that she owned the 
other co-owners’ $50 per month.  See also Whiteman v. Billings Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
25 I.B.I.A. 292, 293 (1994) (quoting BIA letter recognizing “the right of an Indian owner to make 
use of his own land provided the individual claiming the owner’s use is compensating the other 
heirs . . . .”); Cadotte v. Acting Aberdeen Area Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 31 I.B.I.A. 175, 176 
(1997) (“The fact that Appellant owns an undivided interest in the allotment does not excuse his 
non-payment of rent.”). 
 214.  Whiteman, 25 I.B.I.A. at 293–94; see also Smith v. Acting Anadarko Area Dir., Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 34 I.B.I.A. 283, 286 n.5 (2000) (“In no instances should an owner be permitted to 
conduct activities which commit waste.”). 
 215.  Cf. supra notes 24–25 & 30–33 and accompanying text. 
 216.  The doctrine of waste, for example, only prohibits co-owners from interfering with the 
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V. “LANDOWNERS WITHOUT LAND”217 
Thus, already at the end of the twentieth century, there were some 
limits on an Indian landowner’s remaining owner’s use rights.  Many co-
owners had to pay rent for their use of their own property, and a co-
owner seeking to make a non-agricultural use of her own property may 
have had stronger rights to do so if she received her interest by intestacy 
or devise than if she had purchased it.  However, on the whole, there 
persisted some important and relatively informal Indian co-owner use 
and possession right.  This changed in the twenty-first century, when 
even these remaining rights were effectively eliminated.  This section 
covers the changes from 2001 to today that caused, at least by current 
federal law, Indian landowners to retain few, if any, of the rights and 
benefits of owning land. 
A. The 2001 Sea Change 
It took the Department of Interior a long time to draft final 
regulations implementing AIARMA.  Beginning with an initial 
rulemaking in 1996, there was some back-and-forth within the 
Department of Interior regarding the proper scope of protected owner’s 
use rights under AIARMA.  Part of this issue related to whose owner’s 
use rights were protected, because as the Department of Interior 
explained in making its initial proposal of AIARMA regulations in 1996: 
[AIARMA] originally confirmed the rights of individual “allottees” to 
use their own property and negotiate their own leases and permits.  (By 
contrast, the 1940 act [25 U.S.C. § 380] allowed the “heirs and 
devisees” of allottees to prevent us from exercising our broad grant of 
authority on heirship land, by putting the land to direct use or by 
entering into a lease or permit during a three-month negotiation 
period.).218 
                                                          
 
reasonable expectations of their co-owners.  Inactive co-owners who make no effort to use the 
property themselves typically have no expectation in perfect management of the land for their 
benefit.  See generally POWELL, supra note 18, §§ 56.01–56.12; MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 
24, Ch. 9, § 5, at 282–86. 
 217.  Brown, supra note 57. 
 218.  Leasing and Permitting, 61 Fed. Reg. 30560-01, 30562–63 (proposed June 17, 1996) 
(revising 25 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
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Despite this potential confusion about what Congress had meant by 
the carve out for pre-existing owner’s use rights of “allottees,” in its first 
proposed rule-making, the Department of Interior proposed a regulation 
that provided broad owner’s use protections regardless of how the 
individual owner asserting those use rights acquired her interest.  Under 
the first proposed rule implementing AIARMA, the BIA would “not 
grant a lease or permit . . . if the land is used by an individual Indian 
owner and the other owners are receiving a fair annual rental.”219  This 
was also consistent with the IBIA’s interpretation of this statutory 
language later in that same year.220 
Between the time of this first proposed rule recognizing and 
protecting some owner’s use and possession rights for individual Indian 
landowners, regardless of how the co-owner came into that ownership, in 
1996, and the Department of Interior’s final rule in 2001, two major 
things happened.  First, the Cobell litigation took on a life of its own.221  
Secretary of Interior after Secretary of Interior was held in contempt of 
court and the Department was regularly ridiculed for its terrible 
management of, and inability to account for, many of the funds it held in 
trust for individual Indians (including lease revenues from allotted 
lands).222  Maintaining an improved paper trail for the Department of 
Interior’s management of trust funds—and perhaps, trust assets, like the 
land itself—and demonstrating investment return from those assets took 
on a new importance.223  Perhaps because of this, the Department of 
Interior increasingly emphasized formal leasing of Indian lands as “one 
of the most effective ways” to meet its trust obligations to Indian 
landowners.224  Requiring a paper lease and further documentation of 
                                                          
 219.  Id. at 30566. 
 220.  See Emm I, 30 I.B.I.A. 72, 79 (1996). 
 221.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See, e.g., Merjian, supra note 16, at 620–21, 625–26. 
 223.  John C. Sledd, Events Leading to the American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, 
Presentation at Montana State University Symposium (Apr. 12, 2007), at 8, available at 
https://www.iltf.org/sites/default/files/Events%20Leading%20to%20AIPRA%20%28Sledd%29.pdf 
(“Pressured by Cobell, reducing trust liability exposure became a major driver of Interior policy.”). 
 224.  2006 LEASING HANDBOOK, supra note 208, at 2 (stating that although “there is no statutory 
requirement that Indian lands held in trust by the United States Government be leased, the Secretary 
of the Interior has a fiduciary obligation to . . . make decisions concerning trust lands that are in the 
best interest of the Indian landowner,” and “[o]ne of the most effective ways to meet these 
obligations is to put the land under lease.”); see also Fort Berthold Land & Livestock Ass’n v. Great 
Plains Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 35 I.B.I.A. 266, 277 (2000) (explaining that while the 
Department of Interior “has a trust responsibility to ensure that individual Indian landowners receive 
a fair annual rental rate for the use of their lands,” the Department has only a more amorphous 
“duty—which does not, however, rise to the level of a trust responsibility—to assist in the 
development and maintenance of a healthy agricultural economy on reservations”). 
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even a landowner’s own use of the land, with the accompanying rent 
requirement to the other landowner beneficiaries, may have seemed 
especially appealing at this time as a mechanism to avoid further 
potential trust accounting liability.  In fact, in a candid status report on its 
trust improvement process to the Cobell court in January 2002, the 
Department of Interior acknowledged that the degree of fractionation of 
Indian lands was hindering the Department’s ability to perform its trustee 
function efficiently.225  This had at least two primary causes.  One cause 
was the burdensome number of transactions and records to oversee.226  
The second was that the Department had struggled with the conflict 
between “owners’ property rights and the Secretary’s fiduciary duty and 
trust responsibility to both the Indian tribe and the individuals for the 
trust asset.”227  The Department worried that the Secretary was in an 
“awkward” and “conflict[ed]” position of battling competing interests, 
including record-keeping efficiency versus individual property rights.228 
The second major intervening event between the 1996 proposed rule 
and the 2001 final rule was legislative.  As fractionation spun 
exponentially more out of control on the ground (and with it 
Congressional fears of additional trust accounting liability as the 
bureaucratic burden of keeping track of all of these minute interests 
overwhelmed the Department of Interior), Congress focused its 
legislative efforts on consolidating and otherwise decreasing the number 
of small interests it needed to maintain.  Between the initial proposed 
AIARMA leasing rules and the 2001 regulatory changes, Congress 
passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000.229  The 
Senate Indian Affairs Committee explicitly connected the Cobell breach 
of trust lawsuit—and the government’s admission “that it is unable to 
account for the money generated from the use of the (allotted) land 
owned by these individuals”—to the 2000 ILCA Amendments, calling 
those amendments “the primary legislative contribution to this 
comprehensive, inter-governmental effort” to remedy the “most 
destructive legacies of the allotment era,” including the continued 
                                                          
 225.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS REPORT TO THE COURT NUMBER EIGHT: FOR THE 
PERIOD AUG. 1, 2001 TO DEC. 31, 2001 58 (2002), available at http://www.doi.gov/ost/ 
trust_documents/upload/Quarterly_8.pdf. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 62. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2204–2207, 2212–2219 (2012)).  Not all of these 2000 
amendments were implemented.  See Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 764 n.175 & 772. 
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fractionation of Indian lands “and its effect on the Federal government’s 
ability to fulfill its trust obligation to Indian tribes and their members; the 
continuing loss of trust lands as it is inherited by non-Indians; and the 
effect of the allotment policy on Indian tribes.”230 
Like earlier versions of ILCA, many of the 2000 ILCA Amendments 
were aimed to promote consolidation or elimination of small fractional 
ownership interests. 231   Perhaps more significantly for this purpose, 
however, the 2000 ILCA Amendments also adopted a sliding scale for 
the percentage of Indian landowners who must consent to a non-
agricultural lease before the BIA would approve it.232  As in the case of 
the majority lease consent rule for agricultural leases in AIARMA, 
Congress in the 2000 ILCA Amendments was concerned that the 
Department of Interior’s requirement of unanimous consent for an 
owner-approved third-party lease hindered investment because potential 
lessees would avoid the high transaction costs of assembling perfect co-
owner agreement. 
Specifically, ILCA imposed a sliding scale system for the total 
percentages of co-owners’ trust interests required to consent to a non-
agricultural lease of an allotment, depending on the level of fractionation. 
The “minimum consent” requirement for these “non-agricultural” leases 
                                                          
 230.  S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 12 (2000). 
 231.  The original Indian Land Consolidation Act was approved on January 12, 1983.  Indian 
Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515, 2517–19 (1982) (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2201–2210 (1982)).  It was also amended in 1984.  Indian Land Consolidation Act 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-608, 98 Stat. 3171 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 2203–2206, 2211 (2012)).  Initially, Congress sought to force the escheat of the smallest of these 
individual ownership interests to the governing tribe upon the owner’s death, but the Supreme Court 
held this was an unconstitutional taking of Indian landowners’ “right to devise.”  Hodel v. Irving, 
481 U.S. 704 (1987).  Importantly, this escheat provision was also ineffective.  U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-96BR, PROFILE OF LAND OWNERSHIP AT 12 RESERVATIONS, 
at 1–2 (1992) (describing how two more times as many small fractional interests were created than 
the number that would have qualified for escheat under ILCA, even if it had been carried out 
constitutionally).  The ILCA also attempted to provide mechanisms for an individual’s tiny interests 
in a property to be consolidated (through tribal exchange programs or tribal purchase options) and 
sought to create more uniformity and simplicity in intestacy, with the option for tribal probate codes 
as well.  See Shoemaker, supra note 6, at 764–74.  However, these programs were also hyper formal 
and overly complex and therefore often ineffective.  For example, the director of the Land Office at 
the Pine Ridge Reservation reported in June of 1995 that the procedure required for a landowner to 
accomplish one of these ILCA exchanges included at least nine separate steps (including various 
approvals from multiple different offices and administrative levels) and took up to six years for a 
landowner to complete.  Carl G. Hakansson, Allotment at Pine Ridge Reservation: Its Consequences 
and Alternative Remedies, 73 N.D. L. REV. 231, 251 n.165, 256–59 (1997). 
 232.  These ILCA changes were specifically not intended to change the Department of Interior’s 
interpretation of AIARMA, however, which was theoretically the subject of the 1996 and 2001 
rulemakings.  For example, there is a rule of construction that these ILCA and AIPRA sliding scales 
shall not be read to amend or modify AIARMA.  25 U.S.C. § 2218(f) (2012). 
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was based on a sliding scale.233  A bare majority of interests was required 
for tracts with 20 or more Indian owners but unanimous consent was 
required for tracts with five owners or fewer.234  Importantly, unlike 
AIARMA, ILCA did not contain a parallel reservation or mention of 
protecting any pre-existing owner’s use rights. 235   Instead, ILCA 
expressly provided that a lease approved by the requisite percentage of 
fractional trust interests shall be binding upon all of the co-owners of the 
allotment.236  Thus, on its face, this reform could be interpreted to bind 
even any co-owners who may have desired to use the land themselves if 
the requisite percentage of other co-owners agrees to the alternative 
course, and this leaves a co-owner in possession none of the priority or 
veto rights that were arguably protected under AIARMA.237  This new 
rule might be read to allow absentee owners—at least in non-agricultural 
contexts—to evict (effectively) a co-owner in possession merely by 
executing a lease to another party without the in-tenant’s permission 
(assuming they have a sufficient percentage of the other trust interests 
consenting to the lease).238 
                                                          
 233.  Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 sec. 219, 25 U.S.C. § 2218. 
 234.  Id.  The unanimous consent rule for five or fewer owners was reduced to a 90 percent 
consent requirement in 2004.  See 25 U.S.C. § 2218(b) (effective Sept. 7, 2004).  The BIA also has 
the authority to vote on behalf of missing or undetermined co-owners.  § 2218(c); see also S. REP. 
NO. 106-361, at 23 (discussing decision to employ graduated scale because AIARMA’s majority 
rule had not yet been implemented in final rules by BIA); Indian Land Consolidation Act 
Amendments; and to Permit the Leasing of Oil and Gas on Navajo Allotted Lands: Hearing on S. 
1586, S.1315, and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 162 (1999) 
(statement of Delmar Poncho Bigby, Chairman, Indian Land Working Group) (proposing sliding-
scale consent requirement to replace original majority rule provision). 
 235.  S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 12; see also Presidential Statement on Signing the Indian 
Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 45 (Nov. 7, 2000), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2000-11-13/pdf/WCPD-2000-11-13-Pg2811-
2.pdf (legislative purpose was to “enhance opportunities for economic development”). 
 236.  Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 sec. 219, 25 U.S.C. § 2218 
(providing that lease is “binding on” non-consenting co-owners); see also S. REP. NO. 106-361, at 
23. 
 237.  See supra Part IV.C.3. 
 238.  It is not at all clear that this issue was fully vetted and the impact of leasing rules on 
landowners’ rights actually considered by Congress.  However, in the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs report on the legislation, the Committee noted that one of the few instances in which it could 
foresee an Indian landowner wishing to devise land to multiple devisees was “where the deviser is in 
a position to confer ‘use rights’ upon several heirs who are making use of the land.”  S. REP. NO. 
106-361, at 13.  This suggests some understanding of “use rights” still existing as of that time.  
Nonetheless, the final legislative policy statement in the amendments themselves provided that 
Congress should “prevent the further fractionation of trust allotments,” without any express 
discussion of preserving co-owner’s use rights.  Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 
2000 sec. 102(1), 25 U.S.C. § 2201. 
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However, even this possible implicit impact on co-owner’s use and 
possession rights under the 2000 ILCA Amendments is relatively 
limited.  First, it applies on its face only to non-agricultural uses.  
Second, it would only usurp or trump a co-owner’s direct use and 
possession rights, if at all, where a coordinated majority or larger cohort 
of the other co-owners have organized and actively decided to lease the 
property to another.  Nothing about the 2000 ILCA Amendments on their 
face impacted a co-owner’s use and possession rights in the much more 
common scenario where the co-owners have not so organized themselves 
and agreed to pursue an alternative path, where the land is otherwise idle, 
or where the BIA is the party seeking to grant the lease where there is no 
co-owners’ consent and the land is not otherwise in use by a co-owner 
under the 1940 Act. 
Nonetheless, in January 2001, the Department of Interior adopted 
much more sweeping restrictions on owner’s use rights in new leasing 
rules that not only applied AIARMA but also incorporated the outputs of 
its broader trust accounting reform process.239  Although the 2000 ILCA 
Amendments had been passed by the time of this final rule, the 
Department of Interior stated in January 2001 that it would need more 
time to “fully ascertain” the ways in which the 2000 ILCA Amendments 
“extensively alter[ed] the legal framework governing activities on 
fractionated trust and restricted lands” and thus promised more 
regulations incorporating those changes in the future.240 
In proposing these new 2001 rules six months prior, the Department 
of Interior stated that it “recognizes the unique burdens placed on 
potential users of fractionated land,” and requested comments on a new 
“owner’s use” regulation that would require any co-owner of Indian land 
“obtain a lease from all co-owners of the land before using the land 
exclusively for his or her own purposes.”241  The Department explained it 
was considering this requirement “[i]n order to provide maximum 
protection for all trust property beneficiaries.”242  In the final rule in 
2001, the Department of Interior adopted this owner’s use restriction: 
                                                          
 239.  See Trust Management Reform: Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds Held in 
Trust, 66 Fed. Reg. 7068-01, 7069 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 15, 114, 162, 166) 
(describing in greater detail process of drafting new rules as part of sweeping “Trust Management 
Improvement Project”). 
 240.  Id. at 7068 (leaving open new regulations on business and residential leases specifically). 
 241.  Trust Management Reform: Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds Held in Trust: 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 43874-01, 43874–75, 43881 (July 14, 2000) 
(describing new proposal for what it termed the “owner’s use” rule at proposed 25 C.F.R. § 162.67). 
 242.  Id. at 43881. 
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Many questioned whether the individual Indian landowners of 
undivided interests in fractionated tracts would need leases from their 
co-owners (i.e., “owner’s use”), before taking possession.  In response, 
[25 C.F.R.] § 162.104(b) clarifies that an Indian landowner of an 
undivided interest may not take possession without a lease unless the 
Indian co-owners give their permission.243 
In that same paragraph, the Department of Interior also references that it 
was not accepting commentators’ requests to eliminate this requirement 
because “[t]his provision is necessary to ensure protection for, and to 
foster cooperation and negotiation among, all Indian co-owners.”244 
Thus, after this 2001 change, the Department of Interior began 
explicitly requiring a lease or some other form of actual permission from 
the other co-owners before an owner could take possession of any 
portion of the property.  The actual final regulation adopted by the 
Department of Interior, Section 162.104(b), provided: 
An Indian landowner of a fractional interest in a tract must obtain a 
lease of the other trust and restricted interests in the tract, under these 
regulations, unless the Indian co-owners have given the landowner’s 
permission to take or continue in possession without a lease.245 
The Department of Interior applied this regulatory change to all types of 
leases and all manners of lease creation.  Thus, even though AIARMA 
specifically provided that it should not be construed “as limiting or 
altering the authority or right of an individual allottee . . . in the legal or 
beneficial use of his, her, or its own land,” this rule changed arguably 
changed those rights.246 
The Department of Interior also applied this new prior-permission 
concept to its interpretation of the scope of its authority under the 1940 
                                                          
 243.  Trust Management Reform: Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds Held in Trust, 
66 Fed. Reg. at 7081 (emphasis added). 
 244.  Id.  It is unclear who made the “requests to eliminate the owner’s use provision in its 
entirety” referred to in this response.  The public comments from this rule-making are not archived 
on regulations.gov nor are they readily available electronically by request to the National Archives.  
However, it appears by implication that there were objections to this new owner’s use provision 
from the 2000 Proposed Rule limiting co-owner’s use rights in this way, just as there were to further 
reforms in this direction in 2013.  See, e.g., infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 245.  25 C.F.R. § 162.104(b) (2002) (recodified as amended at 25 C.F.R. § 162.005 (2013)).  The 
substance of this rule, with some minor modifications, was moved to 25 C.F.R. § 162.005 in 
regulatory changes in 2013.  See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 246.  25 U.S.C. § 3715(c)(1) (2012).  Perhaps in light of this, there is a special rule for 
agricultural leases, also adopted in 2001, that if a majority of co-owners seek to approve a new lease 
to agricultural land while another co-owner is currently using it, that co-owner in possession must be 
given a right of first refusal to lease the land.  25 C.F.R. § 162.207(c) (2014). 
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Act.  As the Department of Interior explained in the regulatory preamble 
to the 2001 rule change: 
Many respondents questioned the proposed provisions that addressed 
the granting of leases on fractionated tracts, including “owner’s use” 
leases . . . . Section 162.209(b) provides that we will not exercise our 
authority under 25 U.S.C. § 380 [the 1940 Act] to grant a lease on 
behalf of all of the Indian owners of a fractionated tract where the 
Indian co-owners have given one of the Indian landowners permission 
to possess the tract without a lease.247 
Under this new interpretation, for the first time, “permission” from the 
other co-owners is specifically required before an owner in possession 
will be able to preclude the BIA from executing a lease on behalf of the 
owners who otherwise cannot agree to a lease to another. 
Moreover, although this regulation suggests that informal permission 
as opposed to a formal lease may suffice, and perhaps even something as 
informal as acquiescence could bestow an owner’s use right, subsequent 
IBIA decisions clarified that a formal lease may be required in every 
instance.248  In fact, an emphasis on formal leasing relationships among 
co-owners, as opposed to any pre-existing use arrangements, worked its 
way into several IBIA decisions.  For example, in one decision a co-
owner was living on her own allotment pursuant to a lease, but it expired 
too soon to enable her to access a leasehold mortgage.249  She sought an 
amendment to extend the lease term and it was denied by the BIA.250  
The co-owner complained to IBIA that the regional office had previously 
permitted co-owners to use their allotments as residences without a lease 
and that there were in fact others living on her allotment without 
residential leases.251  The IBIA rejected this prior practice and advised 
the co-owner that her remedy was not to have her own residential lease 
amendment approved informally, “but rather to seek action from the BIA 
to remove those persons from the allotment or to obtain proper leases.”252  
Ironically, the IBIA noted that “[t]he Board has found that individuals 
can be quite creative in the ways they resolve disagreements when given 
                                                          
 247.  Trust Management Reform: Leasing/Permitting, Grazing, Probate and Funds Held in Trust, 
66 Fed. Reg. at 7082 (emphasis added). 
 248.  Spang v. Rocky Mountain Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 52 I.B.I.A. 143, 143–44 
(2010) (rejecting Indian co-owners request for flexibility in leasing requirements because even 
Indian co-owners must “obtain a lease of the other trust and restricted interests in the tract”). 
 249.  Chicharello v. S. Plains Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 39 I.B.I.A. 195, 195 (2003). 
 250.  Id. at 195–96. 
 251.  Id. at 197–98 & n.6. 
 252.  Id. at 198 n.6. 
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the opportunity,” but held that the BIA’s leasing rules and statutes 
applied to co-owners without much, if any, flexibility or room for 
creativity.253 
Thus, after the dust settled on the Department of Interior’s 
interpretation of AIARMA, Indian co-owners of land no longer had any 
recognized right to initiate informal use of one’s own property without 
some prior permission or lease from the co-owners.  Previously, both the 
Department and the IBIA had concluded that AIARMA did not permit a 
majority of co-owners to lease an allotment out from under a rent-paying 
co-owner currently in possession.  Furthermore, they both initially 
concluded that a co-owner’s use and possession of land also preempted 
the BIA from leasing that land out on behalf of the other co-owners, 
regardless of how the in-tenant came to own his interest in the allotment.  
Despite this, the Department of Interior’s 2001 regulations effectively 
changed those interpretations.  Open questions remained, however, about 
precisely what owner’s use rights remained, if any, and how the 
Department of Interior’s interpretation of the 2000 ILCA Amendments 
might change this result. 
B. The 2013 Rules Make Problems Worse 
As promised, the Department of Interior finalized additional new 
surface leasing regulations effective January 4, 2013.254  Overall, these 
new regulations were intended to make leasing procedures for 
residential, business, and wind and solar resources (i.e., non-agricultural 
leases) as “explicit and transparent as possible.”255  However, the new 
regulations make some additional significant changes for owner’s use 
rights.  Although the new 2013 regulations say on their face that they do 
not apply to agricultural leases, which are still subject to the 2001 rules, 
in reality it seems the Department of Interior must be applying the 
“general” rules from the 2013 regulations to agricultural leases as well.  
For example, certain “general” rules from the 2001 rules, including the 
new 2001 owner’s use rule itself, were deleted and moved to a new 
“general provisions” rule in the 2013 regulations to “delete 
                                                          
 253.  Id. at 199; see also 2006 LEASING HANDBOOK, supra note 208, at 11 (explaining that while 
an “Indian landowner has the right to use their trust or restricted property” the 2001 regulation 
requires a co-owner of land to “obtain permission or a lease to continue to use the land”). 
 254.  Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 
72440-01 (Dec. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
 255.  Id. at 72440–41. 
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redundancies.”256  In any event, the new 2013 regulations do several 
things.  First, they clarify that the Department of Interior now requires 
full 100 percent co-owner permission before a co-owner may take 
possession without a lease even where the land is not otherwise in use.257  
Second, they further limit the 1940 Act’s owner’s use protections by 
extending them only to sole owners of 100 percent of a property as 
opposed to any co-owner heir.258  And third, they generally provide even 
greater protections for absentee landowners by mandating fair-market 
value rent returns even where the other, active landowners affirmatively 
agree to a lease on different terms.259 
To start, these new regulations clarify that any “Indian landowner of 
a fractional interest in the land” must obtain a lease “from the owners of 
other trust and restricted interests in the land” in order to possess that 
land “unless all of the owners have given you permission to take or 
continue in possession without a lease.”260  Whereas the 2001 regulations 
provided more vaguely that a co-owner must have some degree of 
“permission” from her Indian co-owners to take possession without a 
lease, the 2013 regulations clarify that co-owner possession without a 
lease requires unanimous co-owner permission.  Of course, in a 
traditional tenancy in common, no such pre-possession permission is 
required at all, and the National Congress of American Indians and 
                                                          
 256.  Id. at 72440, 72474; see also 25 C.F.R. § 162.002(b) (2014) (providing “General 
Provisions” part of new rules does not apply to agricultural leases).  But see 25 C.F.R. § 162.005 
(2014) (moving the only owner’s use rules to this “General Provisions” section).  It seems this issue 
was not fully considered in the regulatory drafting, causing confusion. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 
162.209(b)(2) (2014) (continuing to reference now-deleted 25 C.F.R. § 162.104(b) (2002) 
(recodified as amended at 25 C.F.R. § 162.005 (2013)); see also 25 C.F.R. § 162.106(a) (2014) 
(continuing to suggest that agricultural trespass can only occur where “possession is taken without 
an agricultural lease by a party other than an Indian landowner of the tract”). 
 257.  See 25 C.F.R. § 162.005(a) (2014). 
 258.  See 25 C.F.R. § 162.013(c)(6). 
 259.  See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.207(c), 162.421(e), 162.550.  The new rules also, for the first 
time, categorically exempt “permits” for short-term non-possessory, revocable rights for some 
limited uses of Indian land from BIA approval, administration, and enforcement authority.  See 
Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72444–
45; 25 C.F.R. § 162.007 (2014).  By removing some “permits” on Indian allotments from BIA 
oversight and control, this new rule may also implicitly affirm more local control of temporary uses 
of Indian land, including potentially uses by Indian owners themselves.  The new rule, however, 
defines these more flexible “permits” narrowly such that they are not considered an interest in land, 
and grazing and other specified types of common “permits” are still treated separately and are 
subject to extensive BIA oversight and control.  See Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar 
Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. at 72444–45; see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.1–.83, 166.1–
.1001 (separate regulatory section for timber and grazing permits).  This is an area for future analysis 
that warrants more work going forward. 
 260.  25 C.F.R. § 162.005(a) (2014) (emphasis added). 
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others pointed this out to the Department of Interior, arguing that each 
co-owner “has full rights to use the property in any manner” and there 
was “no authority in federal law for BIA to diminish the property rights 
of each Indian co-owner and to require co-owners to pay rent for the use 
of their own property.”261 
The Department of Interior rejected this property-rights argument by 
noting (non-responsively) that their chosen regulation permits a “co-
owner to use the tract if the other fractional co-owners agree.”262  The 
Department of Interior also stated: 
We disagree with the commenters’ claim that each owner has full rights 
to use the property in any manner, because one co-owner does not have 
the right to exclude the others without their consent.  For this reason, 
we reject the commenters’ claim that requiring a lease is diminishing 
the property rights of each co-owner by requiring him or her to pay rent 
for use of his or her own property.263 
This answer is circular and fails to recognize that in fact co-owners do 
have a right to possess the entirety of a property, separate from whether 
they may also have to pay a proportionate rental value for that 
possession. In the non-Indian context, the rule that one co-owner cannot 
exclude another co-owner is managed through the ouster doctrine after 
there is an actual conflict between two active co-owners, not by requiring 
each co-owner to get affirmative permission from all co-owners (both 
active and inactive) before they take any possession of the land. 
The Department of Interior also explained that its intent in permitting 
co-owners to get “permission” from all other co-owners as opposed to 
requiring a full BIA-approved lease was to “provide . . . maximum 
flexibility by allowing for informal agreements.”264  On its face, this is an 
attempt to offer a “permission” route that is less onerous than the formal 
leasing process—however, this fails.  For example, a party seeking a 
lease of an allotment needs only consent from a sliding scale percentage 
of trust interests in the allotment.  However, in order to avoid a lease and 
take possession using this alternative route as a co-owner of the land, the 
co-owner must get unanimous consent from all of the other co-owners.  
In addition, the Department of Interior itself has acknowledged that 
significant numbers of co-owners are missing or their estates are still 
                                                          
 261.  NCAI Comments, supra note 15, at 3; see also NCAI Resolution, supra note 15. 
 262.  Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 
at 72444. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
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pending in the probate queue.  However, under the rules, the BIA may 
only consent on behalf of those unidentified or missing co-owners in a 
formal lease, and presumably not in a more informal permission for co-
owner’s use.265 
Second, the regulations dramatically reduce the effect of the 1940 
Act.  As discussed above, this 1940 Act permits the Department of 
Interior to grant leases on behalf of the Indian owners only when such 
“lands are not in use by any of the heirs.” 266   Prior to these new 
regulations, this Act had been interpreted as protecting a co-owner who 
is in current possession of an allotment from having the land leased out 
to another party by the BIA, typically without requiring any kind of 
prerequisite permission or approval for that owner’s use.  This is also 
consistent with the plain language of the Act that protects “use by any of 
the heirs.”267  Nonetheless, the 2013 regulations now provide that the 
BIA may grant a lease on behalf of Indian co-owners “of a fractionated 
tract” whenever the landowners had notice of the BIA’s intent to execute 
that lease, failed to agree to a lease during the three-month negotiation 
period, and the land is not being used by an Indian landowner who owns 
100 percent of the land and is making use of it.268  Instead of any heir’s 
or devisee’s use preempting BIA authority, this new interpretation 
bizarrely limits the meaning of “any of the heirs” in the 1940 Act to only 
the one heir who owns the entire property exclusively.269 
Finally, there are several other indirect changes that impact what 
little is left of an owner’s use right.  Notably, under the 2013 regulations, 
there continues to be a significant level of protectiveness for non-
consenting or absentee landowners.  For example, where a sliding-scale 
percentage of landowners consents to the lease under ILCA and thereby 
binds non-consenting owners, 270  the non-consenting owners in those 
                                                          
 265.  25 C.F.R. § 162.013(c) (2014) (“BIA may give written consent to a lease . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 266.  25 U.S.C. § 380 (2012). 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  25 C.F.R. § 162.013(c)(6) (2014).  Specifically, the regulation references use by a 
“landowner” defined under § 162.005(b)(1), which is a landowner who owns 100 percent of the 
tract. 
 269.  The illogical nature of this rule is further highlighted by the fact that the regulation itself 
purports to apply to leases of a “fractionated tract,” but by definition a fractionated tract would never 
have a sole owner making use of the land because to be “fractionated” tracts must have more than 
one owner.  This suggests there may be some unintentional Department of Interior error in the 
framework adopted here, but because the BIA also now requires that an owner have 100 percent 
permission or a formal lease before instigating “use” of the property, this issue may never get 
clarified.  See also supra note 256. 
 270.  25 C.F.R. § 162.012(a)(4)(i) (2014). 
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formulas typically are still entitled to fair-market-value rent, even if the 
lease to the consenting owners is for less than that amount.271  These 
regulations also make it more difficult for co-owners to agree to leases 
for less than fair-market-value rent.  For example, the new residential 
leasing rules require residential lessees of individually owned Indian land 
to pay “not less than fair market rental” value.272  Residential leases for 
nominal rent or less than fair market value may only be permitted if 100 
percent of the landowners execute a written waiver of their right to 
receive fair market value—meaning that generally a lease to a co-owner 
cannot be for less than fair market value unless every single interest 
owner agrees (and it is not clear that BIA could ever agree to these 
lesser-rent amounts on behalf of any missing or unidentified co-
owners).273  Even the appraisal requirement generally cannot be waived 
without 100 percent of the landowners’ consent.274  Because at least one 
tribe complained about what these new rules would do to co-owners of 
allotments who had purchased houses on their jointly owned allotments 
without any formal lease from their co-owners under earlier 
interpretations of their co-owner’s use and possession rights, the final 
rule does include a provision permitting some co-owners who resided on 
a tract for at least seven years prior to January 2013 to be grandfathered 
in without an obligation to pay non-consenting landowners fair-market-
value rent, but only if no other co-owner objected to that arrangement 
before July 2013.275 
According to the regulatory comments, several tribes objected to this 
protection for non-consenting and absentee owners.  They worried about 
“real-world constraints” and the fact that the strict fair-market-value 
requirements are “not feasible in many circumstances,” especially in 
light of the Indian housing problem more generally.276  In response, the 
Department of Interior missed the point by saying that “all Indian 
landowners are entitled to just compensation for use of their land (and a 
                                                          
 271.  See 25 C.F.R. § 162.207(c) (non-consenting owners of agricultural lease “must receive a 
fair annual rental”); 25 C.F.R. § 162.421(e) (non-consenting owners and those on whose behalf the 
BIA consented must “receive a fair market rental, as determined by a valuation” for business lease); 
25 C.F.R. § 162.550 (same for wind or solar resource lease). 
 272.  25 C.F.R. § 162.321(a). 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  25 C.F.R. § 162.321(b). 
 275.  25 C.F.R. § 162.321(c).  There are also some special conditions for co-owner leasing of 
business leases.  25 C.F.R.  § 162.421(b). 
 276.  Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land, 77 Fed. Reg. 
72440-01, 72450–51 (Dec. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 162). 
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valuation is required to determine what just compensation is), not just 
consenting landowners.”277 
VI. “FIVE, SIX, PICK UP STICKS”: WHAT COMES NEXT 
It is hard to imagine a property system or co-ownership framework 
better designed to ensure individual co-owners do not make use of their 
own property.  Under current rules, any Indian owner seeking to make 
use of his or her own land has no preemptive possession rights unless he 
or she owns 100 percent of the land.  Any co-owner must now get 
unanimous permission from his or her other co-owners or a formal BIA-
approved lease before taking possession.  In many cases, the BIA may 
grant a lease to another party even when a co-owner is already in 
possession of the land.  And in some cases, a sliding scale percentage of 
the other co-owners may also be able to lease the land out from under a 
current in-tenant.  There is no efficient partition, ouster, or other stable 
exit mechanisms for dissatisfied co-owners.  Even if a co-owner could 
somehow get through the necessary process to acquire her co-owners’ 
consent to possess the land, she must pay her co-owners at least fair 
market value for that possession—and that fair-market-value might be 
based not on her actual use but on the highest and best possible use to 
which the land could ever be put. 
Meanwhile, instead of maximizing the values of these lands and 
encouraging active co-owner cooperation, the federal government’s co-
ownership framework may instead be incentivizing inaction by absentee 
landowners and, by extension, continued fractionation of these Indian 
lands at federal and taxpayer expense—and most importantly, at the 
expense of Indian communities who cannot unlock the full potential of 
their lands.  Under the current system, absentee or uninterested 
landowners face no real cost for continued ownership of ever smaller and 
smaller interests.  There are effectively no pro rata shares of taxes, 
maintenance, or administration costs to be shared among co-owners, and 
absent any real risk of land loss, there is no incentive to coordinate 
actively with co-owners to avoid partitions, foreclosures, or other forced 
sales.278  Instead, Indian co-owners who refuse to cooperate with their 
                                                          
 277.  Id. at 72451; see also id. at 72456 (“[A]ll non-consenting landowners are entitled to fair 
market value, as our trust responsibility is to all landowners, not just those who have consented. . . . 
Each individual can waive his or her own right to receive fair market rental; however, even if a 
majority waives their right to fair market rental, they may not waive the right of the other, non-
consenting owners to fair market rental.”). 
 278.  The fact that administration costs of land held in trust are borne by the federal government 
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other co-owners have the significant advantage.  The absentee landowner 
will likely be rewarded under BIA rules with the highest financial return 
from inaction because the BIA may step in and lease the allotment for 
the co-owners at the highest available market rate.  Or, if he refuses to 
participate in leasing the land and free rides on his co-owners making a 
lease agreement on their own, that absentee landowner is rewarded with 
fair-market-value rental returns even if the active, negotiating 
landowners got less.  Instead of incentivizing consolidation, and co-
owner cooperation, this system encourages continued passive 
fractionation and an ever-expanding BIA land management program. 
The irony here is glaring.  The very system sold as “giving” property 
rights to Indian people over a hundred years ago has actually taken their 
property away.279  This occurred historically through surplus land sales, 
fee patents, and other forms of outright Indian land loss.  Now, the 
complexity of the resulting modern tenure system is also eliminating 
Indian property rights on the lands that remain, including the most 
important right to possess their own land.  Although recent regulatory 
reforms were likely executed with at least some good intention to protect 
the interests of all trust beneficiaries at a time of crisis for the federal 
trustee function, this quiet loss of Indians’ co-owner property rights is 
worth greater exploration and debate.  The trust status that was intended 
to support and protect new Indian owners in their status as part of a 
community of active landowners is becoming more like a bean-counting 
system of dwindling returns far removed from real property rights.  
Indian landowners are more like minor shareholders with only paper 
rights to a commodity over which they have very little control—all at the 
expense of local property rights.  This does not seem to be in the best 
interest of the community of landowners within indigenous nations or for 
anyone who contributes to the federal government’s continued 
investment in this counter-productive system. 
This elimination of indigenous possession rights over time raises a 
host of important legal issues.  This section begins to explore some of 
these challenges and concerns but concludes, most fundamentally, that 
work must be done at a tribal level, with full and adequate federal 
                                                          
 
leads to “inertia and opposition of some of the Indians themselves” as it creates “a situation 
particularly attractive to persons with small interests who are content to receive small returns with 
little effort.”  Williams, supra note 167, at 725. 
 279.  See also ANGELIQUE TOWNSEND EAGLEWOMAN & STACY L. LEEDS, MASTERING 
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 30 (2013). 
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support, to create a more rational system of Indian land tenure in which 
individual Indians can realistically and flexibly make use of their own 
land.  This section proceeds by first highlighting some of the potential of 
informal owner’s use arrangements, even in highly fractionated 
conditions.  Then, it addresses the need for tribally driven solutions 
followed by some discussion of the reasons the federal government must 
respond accordingly to facilitate this transition to a system of owner’s 
use in a locally congruent way. 
A. The Promise and Potential of Owner’s Use 
Indian lands are not the only resource held by an otherwise 
disenfranchised group to suffer from extreme fractionation concerns.  For 
example, “heir property” is prevalent among African Americans in the 
South and certain families in Appalachia, both communities who 
experience an overall failure of access to the probate process.280  The risk 
of land loss for these co-owners is high, and title is relatively insecure.  
Landowners must coordinate, among themselves and without the 
assistance of any kind of federal trustee or facilitator, to bear and allocate 
the shared costs of ownership, including for example property tax or lien 
obligations, or they risk foreclosure or other forced sales of the land.281  
In addition, any defecting co-owner may unilaterally force a partition.282  
Because of the number of co-owners in these properties, this usually 
results in a forced partition sale, with pre-existing co-owners unable to 
aggregate the resources to redeem the property.283 
Indian lands, with their restraints on alienation, the trustee to perform 
administrative and record-keeping tasks, and exemption from state 
property tax and other similar costs of maintaining fractionated 
ownership interests, do not share these same risks.  However, while 
insecurity is an important concern for other types of heir property co-
owners, they do have some advantages over their Indian counterparts.  
Most notably, the broad possessory rights for all co-owners in non-Indian 
tenancies in common leave an option for, or even a preference of, a local 
                                                          
 280.  See, e.g., Janice F. Dyer & Conner Bailey, A Place to Call Home: Cultural Understandings 
of Heir Property Among Rural African Americans, 73 RURAL SOC. 317 (2008); Jess Gilbert, Gwen 
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owner’s use of his or her own land, and therefore preserve a pathway for 
informal use arrangements among co-owners.  Thus, in heir property 
examples in the South or in Appalachia, there are several concrete case 
studies of landowners who appreciate the informality of possession rights 
that permit self-help arrangements for use among owners in shared 
possession. 284   These default rules permit internal, place-specific 
arrangements among co-owners for owner’s use of the land where 
exclusive, individual land ownership may not be feasible or desired.  
Maintaining this mechanism for flexible, place-specific arrangements for 
shared use incentivizes land stewardship and development of the land by 
the owners themselves, and also puts some onus on the non-possessing 
owners to monitor and actively interact with their lands and co-owners if 
they want to influence its use. 
Of course, it is this informal possession right that is entirely missing 
from most Indians’ experience.  However, because of a few idiosyncratic 
quirks of Indian law and history, there are a small handful of tribes who 
escaped application of some of the top-down federal tenure rules for 
individually owned Indian trust property, including allotment itself, and 
these tribes do demonstrate some of the benefits associated with a 
retained informal use right.  For example, the tribes of the arid southwest 
largely escaped allotment because, in that climate and landscape, federal 
officials acknowledged that “tribes such as the Navajo had to live 
communally to survive,” and “[t]hese nomadic herdsmen who followed 
the grass and rain could not exist on 80 or even 320 acres.”285  Therefore, 
the Navajo today still operate with some of their own indigenous 
property systems and tenure rules on remaining reservation lands.  Many 
“families are organized in ‘camps’ consisting of several generations” 
with “[c]lustered housing—mobile homes, hogans, and/or frame built 
houses and sheds” and a sharing of work, meals, and resources in a 
culturally cognizant way that has proven effective to some degree in 
reducing some of the effects of poverty that are otherwise felt on other 
reservations.286  The Navajo Nation recognizes these internally managed 
property rights as an unrecorded but valid jointly-owned customary use 
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right that is protected against other development—just as many 
indigenous Indian property institutions did originally—and today the 
Navajo are one of the most economically successful and independent of 
the Indian nations.287 
Likewise, a lack of clarity about the Department of Interior’s 
interpretation of its individual Indians’ property rights before the 2001 
and 2013 rules led to some different practices at different BIA agencies 
until recently.  Thus, when the Department of Interior was considering 
its 2013 leasing regulations requiring co-owners to have leases or 100-
percent owner consent before taking possession of their own land, even 
for a residence, and requiring rent payments to other co-owners in almost 
every case, the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community complained 
bitterly that Indian landowners were being required to “rent[] their own 
land” and this did “not reflect the reality of reservation life.” 288  
According to the Salt River comments, various federal, state, and tribal 
programs from 1960 to 2003 had assisted individual Indians to build 
homes in their area on their jointly owned Indian lands, with no 
requirement of a formal lease.  These individual Indian landowners were 
living on these lands, in homes they had long since paid for, without a 
formal lease from their co-owners.289  As one individual citizen of the 
Salt River community told the Department of Interior, sharing land with 
immediate family members living next door was part of his “[h]eritage as 
a [t]ribe,” and he and his family members “wanted to live the rest of our 
lives on our land.”290  This landowner worried that obtaining signatures 
of all of the co-owners, where many of his family members had already 
died, “would be next to impossible,” and “[h]aving to pay rent to live on 
our own land would create a tremendous hardship not only for myself 
but for everyone involved” and would “change relationships and the 
culture of our families and of this Community.”291 
Of course, although not perfect, these kinds of flexible, individual 
use rights and local arrangements were also inherent in historic 
indigenous tenure systems.  At least some of these indigenous systems 
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included their own efficient mechanisms to prioritize management of 
jointly owned lands by active, present co-owners who maintained a 
physical connection to the land and also provided a seamless exit 
mechanism for departing landowners.292  Indeed, as far back as 1934, 
when Congress and others were realizing the devastation that was being 
wrought by allotment, some voices in government were already looking 
longingly back at the kind of indigenous Indian land tenure systems in 
place before allotment.  These government officials argued that the 
model for future land tenure decisions in Indian Country should be 
“derived from the example of those Indian reservations which had not 
been broken up and allotted, reservations in which all of the land 
remained in common ownership, hence was safe against loss, while the 
Indian had the right to use and occupy as much of the tribal land as he 
could beneficially employ.”293  Reintroducing these original indigenous 
systems of land tenure was already seen as difficult in 1934, with the 
new federal system having “taken deep root.” 294   Of course those 
challenges persist, and are magnified, today. 
Nonetheless, some renewed recognition of the potential for 
reinstating informal owner’s use rights on Indian lands, in light of the 
expansive needs for housing, income, and development among Indian 
people, and the large chunks of unused land theoretically owned by these 
individuals, has exciting potential.  Owner’s use alone may not solve 
every land tenure problem.  The combined factors of fractionation and 
the federal trust restrictions do limit the overall utility of land for 
individual owners, and issues like access to credit for development on 
these lands will remain.295  Indian landowners may also be limited by the 
relatively small size of some original allotments, general remoteness of 
some of these lands, or actual disagreements among co-owners. 296  
Nonetheless, while the current federal trust status provides many 
protections against further land loss and also helps serve as a protective 
barrier between tribes, tribal citizens, and states seeking to assert greater 
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jurisdiction within Indian Country, 297  an ideal co-ownership system 
would maintain the benefits of this trust status for Indian landowners 
while also maximizing flexibility for Indian use and determination of 
Indian lands for Indian futures. 
Reforms could maximize the advantages of the trust status, including 
the federal record-keeping and administrative role that is essential and 
fair in light of the federal cause of the current fractionation challenges, 
while also enabling some more flexible owner’s use arrangements and 
streamlining the paternalistic components of the federal trust status.  For 
example, I have previously argued that the federal government must 
continue to act at least as an administrative trustee for these co-owners—
bearing the cost of maintaining these complex records, for example—and 
that the current fractionation problems cannot be resolved just by a 
simple removal of the federal trustee relationship.298  However, carefully 
crafted trust reforms could help, including for example eliminating just 
the Secretary’s approval requirements for transactions among tribal 
citizens where tribal laws could protect individuals from fraud or unfair 
dealings without cumbersome federal oversight of every transaction.299  
That possibility holds great promise; especially as the Cobell buy-back 
plan takes effect, and the average number of co-owners on individual 
tracts decreases, and the size of individual shares potentially increase. 
In addition, the Department of Interior could make relatively modest 
changes to its leasing programs to start to better balance the interests of 
both local and distant absentee owners and avoid the perverse incentives 
of the current system, at least while simultaneously supporting tribes in 
implementing their own local tenure reforms.  For example, while 
current laws theoretically seek to promote democratic decision-making 
among co-owners of an allotment by reducing the number of interests 
that must consent to a lease, the Department of Interior could revise the 
definition of “majority” for these purposes so that the agreement of a 
majority of the landowners who responded to the BIA’s inquiry 
regarding any given land transaction would bind the other non-
participating landowners.  This would create some gentle pressure on 
otherwise remote or absent landowners to participate, and if they fail to 
do so, they should be bound by the decision of the participating co-
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owners, at least under a waiver or laches theory.  In addition, Indian 
landowners should be permitted to match lease offers from third parties 
seeking to use their land in all cases, and tribal credit institutions for 
Indian landowners seeking to invest in use of their own land must be 
further developed.  Finally, even if the Department of Interior’s primary 
concern is financial return for absentee landowners, the Department must 
evaluate how its current owner’s use policy is counter-productive—at 
least for the approximately one-half of jointly-owned lands that are 
presently sitting idle or not generating any income at all. 
B. Property Rights Matter 
Certainly, simply resolving to embrace a more flexible owner’s use 
priority in the Indian land tenure system would quickly invite some 
difficult value-setting questions.  Are only particular types of uses 
permitted by owners on the land?  Are there eligibility requirements for 
an “owner” to qualify to take direct possession of the land?  What if an 
outsider (perhaps an Indian citizen of another tribe) simply purchased a 
small interest of land from a distant heir and then sought to use the entire 
allotment at a discounted rate?  What if a tribal member did that?  Could 
she really claim a trumping owner’s use right as against other heirs and 
owners?  What if multiple co-owners disagree about how to share in use 
of the land?  What if a lease has already been executed?  Can the 
objecting co-owner use the land in cooperation with the lessee, or is she 
prohibited from making her own uses of the land until there is an 
opening or an actual vacancy on the land?  Should a co-owner in 
possession have to pay rent for her possession?  How will that rent 
amount be determined?  Who pays for improvements? 
How all of these questions are answered will inform which values 
the property rules promote and prioritize.300  One of the certain lessons of 
allotment and the current Indian land tenure problem is that uniform, top-
down federal property reforms do not work in Indian Country and have 
expansive unintended consequences.  In addition, as evidenced by the 
lasting and widespread effects of allotment itself, property rules are 
significant and do matter on several social, political, cultural, and 
economic levels.  Although both the federal government, and by 
extension the American taxpayer, have a stake in how this co-ownership 
form is defined to the extent it might result in federal liability or creates a 
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federal expense in the continued administration of excessively 
fractionated land, it is the Indian people and Indian nations who must be 
allowed to assert ultimate control over their own tenure choices.  
Consistent with the current federal policy to encourage Indian self-
determination in many spheres, there must be some tribal flexibility in 
the administration of a property system, and nearly every scholar or 
student to address any aspect of this issue agrees that solutions must be 
tribally chosen consistent with local objectives.301 
The difficulty for tribes in creating, implementing, and securely 
establishing these new tenure systems must not be under-estimated.  The 
federal government should act to clarify tribes’ pre-existing sovereign 
authority to make these changes, in order to avoid dispute and encourage 
certainty in the process.302  However, tribes must also take a significant 
political risk.  There is no way to reform these tenure systems without 
displeasing someone.  While there will be no solution that satisfies all 
co-owners, the fact that the Cobell settlement has provided significant 
consolidation funds to purchase small, undivided interests from willing 
sellers may make this change in property system more palatable right 
now.  To the extent a remote owner feels prejudiced by the ability of a 
possessing owner to use the land, perhaps at lower than market rates, that 
owner could have a viable exit option at this unique moment in time by 
selling his or her interest to the tribe under the Cobell buy-back 
program.303 
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C. Trust Conflicts Must Be Further Resolved 
Finally, while it is true that any future property decisions must be 
designed by tribes as reflections of their own local priorities, values, and 
resource conditions, the federal government must also respond and 
strongly support this endeavor.  This is true for many reasons.  The 
current system may expose the federal government to legal liability and, 
simultaneously, is having the perverse effect of actually exacerbating the 
fractionation it is supposed to be ameliorating.  In addition, the federal 
government has previously acknowledged that the fractionation issues 
that are flaming these challenges were created by federal law in the first 
place, and the federal government therefore has the obligation to support 
solutions and bear the burden of its mistakes as the solution is sought. 
As for potential federal liability for continued inaction, the 
elimination of the “right to use” and “right to possession” sticks in the 
Indian landowners’ property bundle may result in takings liability under 
the Fifth Amendment.  It may be a violation of the federal trust 
responsibility to Indian landowners to burden use and possession so 
substantially, or it may constitute an ultra vires agency action in 
violation of the repeated federal laws intended, conversely, to promote 
Indian use of Indian land.  All of these potential liabilities warrant their 
own, more detailed analysis beyond the scope of this article. 304  
However, the legitimacy of the Department of Interior’s current and 
future actions must be seriously evaluated. 
More fundamentally, however, the trend to eliminate owner’s use 
and possession rights reflects a larger identity crisis within the 
Department of Interior and within federal Indian law.  The trust-based 
restrictions on these lands are growing rather than receding over time, 
and the foundations for this must be explored. Is the Department of 
Interior really a trustee for absentee landowners’ “right to income,” or for 
the “right to possession” of local landowners who would make direct use 
of the land?  Or should the Department of Interior primarily support 
tribal governments in their own application of reemerging tribal property 
laws?  These questions are not easy ones to answer as many Indian 
landowners have a reasonable and well-founded expectation that, after 
the federal government caused fractionation, it must do its best by the 
remaining owners of these tiny fractional interests.305  Because of the 
                                                          
 304.  The author intends to address these issues further in future work. 
 305.  See, e.g., 2006 LEASING HANDBOOK, supra note 208, at 2 (stating the Department of 
Interior identifies leasing as one of the major ways it fulfills its trust responsibility). 
2014] NO STICKS IN MY BUNDLE 449 
extreme degree of fractionation, BIA leasing of the property for its 
highest rental value on behalf of the hundreds or thousands of co-owners 
may be the best and most fair result in many instances.  However, the 
Department of Interior’s decision-making seems increasingly to overlook 
the tension between the financial interests of absentee landowners and 
the property rights of landowners themselves.  An exclusive emphasis on 
the financial return for absentee landownership, at the expense of 
landowners’ own possession rights, is contrary to at least one primary 
purpose of the individual lands’ trust status: to protect, promote, and 
enable Indian landowners, as citizens of functioning sovereign tribal 
governments, to make direct use of their own lands while preventing 
further land loss.306 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Every other proposed Indian land tenure reform to date has failed to 
create tribal economies of enfranchised landowners making direct use of 
their own land.  The modern structural design of individual Indian’s 
property rights within co-ownership forms is now contributing to this 
problem.  Current rules perversely prohibit Indian possession even if that 
land is currently not in use at all, and instead the rules incentivize 
landowner inaction by eliminating any costs of continued ownership and 
making it more profitable, because of the nature of BIA oversight, for 
landowners to do nothing rather than try to coordinate actively with other 
co-owners. 
Although the original allotment proponents intended to create a 
pattern of self-supporting farming entrepreneurship throughout Indian 
Country by implementing a version of private property on top of existing 
indigenous land use arrangements, this effort failed.  Today, Indians 
endure one of the most complicated land tenure systems ever designed, 
and the smoke and mirrors created by the complex bureaucratic system 
has, to date, obscured the fact that, more recently, Indian property 
systems have evolved into an unusual and highly unique form of 
“property” without any meaningful possession rights for many individual 
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landowners.  Tribes must be supported in developing more flexible and 
coherent tenure systems for Indians’ use of Indian lands.  The 
Department of Interior must also evaluate the institutional disincentives 
it is creating by the current system and work to favor active owner 
participation in land management. In many cases, this may call for 
prioritizing possession and use by individual Indian landowners.  
Although a continuation of federal support through administrative, 
accounting, and record-keeping functions is essential to maintain this 
complicated system, tribally driven property reforms are an important 
next step. 
 
